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Abstract
The transport and urban economics literature applies di¤erent labor supply approaches
when studying economic or planning instruments. Some studies assume that working hours
are endogenous while the number of workdays is given, whereas others model only decisions
on workdays. Unfortunately, empirical evidence does hardly exist on account of missing
data. Against this background, we provide an assessment of whether general e¤ects of
transport policies are robust against the modeling of leisure demand and labor supply. We
introduce di¤erent labor supply approaches into a spatial general equilibrium model and
discuss how they a¤ect the welfare implication of congestion policies. We, then, perform
simulations and nd that in many cases the choice of labor supply modeling not only a¤ects
the magnitude of the policy impact but also its direction. While planning instruments are
suggested to be quite robust to di¤erent labor supply approaches, the way of modeling labor
supply may crucially a¤ect the overall welfare implications of economic instruments such
as congestion tolls. Based on these ndings it becomes clear which labor supply approach
is the most appropriate given specic conditions. Our study also emphasizes the need for
better micro labor market data that also feature days of sickness, overtime work used to
reduce workdays, the actual number of leave days, part-time work, days with telecommuting
etc.
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Introduction
Since several decades transportation and urban economists have been discussing the e¢ -
ciency and the impact of di¤erent transportation policies. In this regard the corresponding
literature applies di¤erent labor supply approaches when studying economic (price based)
or planning instruments. In many studies labor supply/leisure demand is treated as xed
(e.g.McDonald, 2009; Wrede, 2009) or the residual of a time endowment net of travel
time (e.g.Brueckner, 2005; Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002; Rhee et al., 2014). However,
there is also a number of studies where a labor/leisure choice is explicitly taken into ac-
count, either by assuming that working hours (per day) are endogenous while workdays
are xed (e.g.Anas and Kim, 1996; De Palma and Lindsay, 2004) or by assuming that
the number of workdays is endogenous while working hours (per day) are given (Arnott,
2007; Tscharaktschiew and Hirte, 2010a).1 In the overwhelming majority the decisions
for the approach chosen seem to be based on convenience and tractability. Even within
a certain eld of interest, labor supply approaches are not consistently applied. For ex-
ample, studies examining price based measures for tackling congestion make use of the
endogenous working hours assumption (e.g.Anas and Xu, 1999), the endogenous work-
days approach (Verhoef, 2005), the assumption that labor supply is a residual (Lucas and
Rossi-Hansberg, 2002; Brueckner, 2005), or leisure is the residual of leisure endowment
minus travel time while labor supply is xed (e.g. Rhee et al., 2014). The same is true
with respect to studies dealing with regulatory measures (land-use or tra¢ c regulations).
For example, Olwert and Guldmann (2012) assume endogenous working hours, Nitzsche
and Tscharaktschiew (2013) apply the endogenous workdays approach, and Rhee et al.
(2014) treat labor supply as residual.
From an empirical point of view, distinguishing labor supply decisions along the intensive
margin, i.e. changes in hours worked or workdays for those who are working, and along the
extensive margin, i.e. changes in labor-force participation respectively, is crucial since both
margins are suggested to be imperfect substitutes (Blank, 1988; Blundell and MaCurdy,
1999; Dechter, 2013; Hammermesh, 1996; Heckman, 1993; Hanoch 1980a,b). For example,
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Heckman (1993) show that almost all of the observed
variation in labor supply is generated by changes in labor force participation whereas
working hours (intensive) responses estimated conditional on working tend to be very
close to zero across di¤erent demographic subgroups and earnings levels (Kleven and
1Tables 79 in Appendix A provide a more extensive overview on studies relying on one of these ap-
proaches. Hereafter the former is referred to as workhoursapproach and the latter workdaysapproach.
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Kreiner, 2006). Decisions on workdays belong to both categories, because changes in the
number of workdays can be varied almost marginal by being ill, telecommuting etc. and,
on the other hand, the number of workdays in a year depend on the share of the year
someone is participating in the labor-force.
Di¤erences concerning intensive and extensive responses are usually traced back to the
presence of costs associated with labor force participation (Cogan, 1981). These costs
may comprise indirect costs of labor force participation such as expenses to child care but
also, in particular, monetary and time costs of commuting. These costs then may result in
economies of scale in the extensive labor supply decision thereby making very low hours of
work unattractive. If workers are able only to choose their number of working hours per
day, these costs can be seen as xed costs of labor supply. In contrast, if working hours
are given while the number of workdays can be chosen, these costs are no longer xed
but become a variable cost. Theoretically, the e¤ect of commuting costs on the number
of workdays is ambiguous because an increase in monetary costs induces both an income
and a substitution e¤ect whereas in an working hours approach changes in labor supply
are only induced by income e¤ects.
These ndings carefully suggest the application of the workdays approach (see also Fos-
gerau and Pilegaard, 2007). Unfortunately, due to data restrictions there is almost no
empirical evidence on how workers explicitly respond to changes in commuting costs
thereby making the application of either the workhours or workdays approach to some
extent arbitrary. An exemption is Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren (2010) exam-
ining the e¤ect of commuting distance on workerslabour supply patterns, distinguishing
between weekly labour supply, number of workdays per week and daily labour supply, and
accounting for endogeneity of distance by using employer-induced changes in distance. By
using German data from the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years 1997-2007, their
analyses suggest that commuting distance slightly increases daily and weekly labour sup-
ply while the number of workdays is hardly a¤ected. Hence, workers with long commutes
appear to increase their weekly hours mainly by increasing their daily labour supply, but
the e¤ects are relatively small.
Furthermore, many instruments available and discussed to tackle transport related issues
focus explicitly on workdays and others have a workday related component. In contrast,
working hours are usually only indirectly a¤ected. Here one can think of a cordon toll, a
congestion toll, a fuel tax, an emission tax, a miles tax or parking fees. Their tax base
depends in particular on the number of trips, i.e. the number of workdays but not on
daily working hours (though of course less working hours allows more leisure and shop-
ping travel during workdays). If workdays can be varied, there is a substitution in favor
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of daily working hours and, since working becomes more expensive on average, in favor
of aggregate leisure time. In contrast, as mentioned before when workdays are xed such
measures provide a pure income e¤ect but no substitution e¤ects. As a consequence, wel-
fare e¤ects and other impacts of these and further related policies might di¤er depending
on the labor supply approach employed.2
To sum up, neither are the labor supply responses along their margins fully clear which
makes the right choice of the labor supply approach di¢ cult nor are the implications of
the di¤erent labor supply approaches on the ndings of transport policy analyses known
at all.
Against this background, we provide an assessment of whether general e¤ects of transport
policies are robust regarding magnitude and direction against the modeling of leisure de-
mand and labor supply. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst study doing that.
In order to account also for indirect e¤ects we choose a general equilibrium approach that
includes transport and spatial location decisions, i.e. the Anas-type model (see Anas and
Xu, 1999). We apply this model to congestion as one of the most prominent issues in
transportation economics and examine ve policies aimed at tackling congestion: Pigou-
vian congestion tolls, a cordon toll, a miles tax, the investment in road infrastructure
capacities to alleviate congestion, and a land-use type regulation (zoning).
We proceed as follows: We rst analytically derive the value of times (VOTs) of the
di¤erent approaches with constrained utility maximization. In addition to the existing
traditional labor supply approaches (workhours or workdays) we propose a hybrid model
where households decide simultaneously on working hours and workdays. Then we derive
welfare changes induced by transport policies and show how labor supply modeling a¤ects
the welfare components in the second-best urban model. Since theory does not allow to
derive the direction of the overall welfare e¤ect unambiguously, we then perform simu-
lations for the policies mentioned above and for a wide range of assumptions concerning
landownership and revenue recycling. We also consider homogeneous and inhomogeneous
leisure across days, because Hanoch (1975) and Oi (1976) emphasize that leisure on a
workday and leisure on a non-workday are inhomogeneous and thus should be treated as
di¤erent arguments in the utility function (evidence see Dechter, 2013). In contrast, all
prior policy papers, among them the selection listed in Appendix A, implicitly assume
that leisure is homogeneous, i.e. they do not care about whether leisure is enjoyed on
2For example, Kleven and Kreiner (2006) show that it is crucial to account for the presence of non-
convexities created by xed work costs. In the non-convex framework, tax and transfer reforms may
generate rst-order e¤ects on government revenue. These revenue e¤ects make e.g. the marginal cost of
public funds substantially higher.
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workdays or non-workdays.
Most importantly we nd that in many cases the choice of labor supply modeling not only
a¤ects the magnitude of a policy impact but also its direction. While planning instruments
are suggested to be quite robust to di¤erent labor supply approaches, the way of modeling
labor supply crucially a¤ects the overall welfare implications of economic instruments such
as congestion tolls. The overall welfare e¤ects of an economic instrument also depends
on whether leisure is assumed to be homogeneous or inhomogeneous. Interestingly, we
also nd that in regard to the level of congestion the choice of the labor supply approach
is of secondary importance. The reason is that the missing opportunity for commuters
to adjust the frequency of commuting trips in a workhours approach is suggested to be
o¤set by stronger relocation. The hybrid approach we suggest is less sensitive to changing
modeling features and provides more conservative results. Eventually, we provide clear
recommendations on which approach is adequate under which conditions. Our study is
also important because it emphasizes the need to get better micro labor market data that
also feature days of sickness, overtime work used to reduce workdays, the actual number
of leave days, part-time work, days with telecommuting etc.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we introduce the di¤er-
ent labor supply approaches employing a spatial urban representative household model,
derive individual rst-order conditions and discuss di¤erences in resulting VOTs and con-
sumer prices. In Section 2 we extend the approach to a spatial general equilibrium model
and discuss how di¤erent labor approaches may a¤ect the welfare implication of anti-
congestion policies. Here we choose Pigouvian congestion tolls for exposition. In Section
3 we then perform numerical simulations to verify size and sign of the e¤ects involving
all other policies under consideration. The ndings of the simulation then result in rec-
ommendations under which conditions a certain labor supply approach might be most
appropriate. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
1 General labor supply approaches
Before considering the welfare implication of di¤erent policies under di¤erent labor supply
modeling procedures, we rst describe the basic model setup and derive optimality con-
ditions of the di¤erent labor supply approaches. This allows us to provide basics insight
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into how the approaches di¤er in particular with respect to the values of time (VOT)3
and further prices.
1.1 General setup
We assume an urban area that is composed of J = 2 zones (j = 1 is assumed to be the city
(center) and j = 2 represents suburban areas) indexed i; j and k with xed land supply A
where i; j and k denote the residential, work, and shopping location, respectively. Firms
may produce in each zone and households can live and work in each zone, too. Depending
on location choice set ij; the utility function of a city household uij (zij; qij;Lij) + "ij is
composed of deterministic utility uij and a stochastic utility component, "ij, reecting
idiosyncratic preferences for location pattern ij (see Anas and Xu, 1999). In the rst
stage households decide on consumption, z, housing, q, and depending on the labor
supply approach considered leisure demand L,4 given their location choice ij. In the
second stage households choose their zone of residence i and their working zone j in a
multinomial logit framework by comparing indirect utilities.
Assuming symmetry, this local decision determines the two-way commuting distance of
household type ij, mij,
mij  mi + ijmj ; 8i; j; , ij = 0 if i = j, ij = 1 if i 6= j, (1)
where mi is distance traveled in zone i and ij 2 f0; 1g is an indicator that is unity if
i 6= j and zero otherwise. We assume that car is the only travel mode available and
that for the time being road capacities are xed and normalized to unity. In addition
to commuting trips from zone i to zone j; there are shopping trips, where consuming
one unit of z requires one shopping trip. Hence, the number of commuting trips (=
workdays Dij since we focus on on-site work ignoring telecommuting) plus the number
of shopping trips (= the number of consumption bundles
P
kzijk) determine the number
of trips traveled by a household facing location pattern ij: We assume that congestion
occurs only during peak hours where commuting takes place, while shopping trips are
only made at o¤-peak hours. By assuming that every trip within a zone is of the same
length, aggregating commuting tra¢ c of all households residing in zone i and working in
all zones j (including i = j) and of all households residing in zone j but commuting to
3The theoretical and empirical literature on time valuation involves the studies of e.g. Becker, 1965; De
Serpa, 1971; Jara-Díaz, 2007; Jara-Díaz et al., 2008; Johnson, 1966; Oort, 1969; Small, 2012; Small and
Verhoef, 2007.
4The concrete shape of L will be specied below.
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zone i gives zone specic commuting tra¢ c ow in zone i; Fi: Commuting travel time
required for one unit of distance of two-way commuting in or through zone i, ti = ti (fi) ;
then depends on peak tra¢ c density fi = Fi=Ki where t0 > 0 and Ki is road capacity.
Accordingly, two-way commuting (shopping) travel time for a trip from zone i to zone
j (k) is
tij (fi; fj)  miti (fi) + ijmjtj (fj) (2)
tzik  miti + ikmktk: (3)
In the following we denote leisure hours on a workday by `, leisure days by L, leisure hours
on a leisure day by l, daily working hours by h, workdays by D, daily time endowment
by e, and endowment of days per year by E.
The utility function in the inhomogeneous leisure approach can be written
uij (zij1;:::;zijJ ; qij;L1ij;L2ij) , (4)
while in the homogeneous leisure approach it is
uij (zij1;:::;zijJ ; qij;L1ij + L2ij) , (5)
where L1  `ijDij and L2  lijLij is aggregate leisure on workdays and leisure days. re-
spectively. Households may shop in each district and spatially di¤erentiated consumption
is denoted by zijk, i.e. shopping of household type ij in zone k. Households are subject
to monetary budget constraint (6a), a daily time constraint for a workday (6b), another
for a leisure day (6c) and a yearly day restriction (6d). The set of constraints isX
k
(pk + c
z
ik) zijk + r
q
i qij =
 
wnj hij   cij

Dij + I (6a)
eDij = (hij + tij)Dij + `ijDij + 
X
k
tzikzijk (6b)
eLij = lijLij + (1  ) tzikzijk (6c)
E = Dij + Lij (6d)
where pk is the price of the consumption goods basket in shopping location k, cij (czik)
are monetary travel costs for commuting (shopping) trips from i to j (k) including travel
taxes  where ij  i + ijj, rqi is the housing land price per square foot in zone i,
wnj = (1  w)wj is the hourly net wage in working zone j, w is the labor tax, I is
non working income, and  is the exogenous share of shopping done on workdays. The
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time endowments per day are multiplied by the respective number of days just to tie
Lagrangian multipliers to hours per day not hours per year.
1.2 VOTs and consumer prices with di¤erent approaches
We now give a short overview on the individual decisions and the resulting VOTs for
di¤erent labor supply approaches. We immediately start with the most interesting case
whose features are usually not taken into account. The endogeneity of workdays as well
as working hours and the fact that the valuation of leisure depends on the day under
consideration, i.e. leisure is inhomogeneous.
1.2.1 Inhomogeneous hybrid approach (Y i)
For the time being we drop indices i, j and k and write c as two-way travel costs for
commuting and t as two-way commuting time. Further we write z instead of zijk 8k and
use cz for two-way monetary transport costs for shopping and tz for two-way shopping
travel time. Then the Lagrangian becomes
L = u

z; q;L1
`D
;L2
lL

+  f(wnh  c)D + I   (p+ cz) z   rqqg+  fE   L Dg (7)
+  feD   (h+ t)D   `D   tzzg+  feL  lL  (1  ) tzzg ,
where ; ;  and  are the Lagrangian multiplies of the corresponding constraints. Dif-
ferentiating yields the rst-order conditions (FOCs) and eventually the VOT of an hour
on a workday, VOTDY i, the VOT of a leisure day, VOTLY i, and the VOT of a leisure
hour on a leisure day, VOTlY i (see Appendix B.1):5
VOTDY i:


= wn =
uL1

, (8)
VOTLY i:


= wn (e  t)  c (9)
VOTlY i:


=


1
e
=
wn (e  t)  c
e
= wn   w
nt+ c
e
. (10)
The VOTDY i is equal to the net wage. The VOT of a leisure day is equal to the value of the
time endowment of a day minus time and monetary travel costs that cannot be avoided
5Because of the fact that the hybrid approach is the most general case which basically includes the
workdays and workhours approach as special cases, for convenience we provide the derivation of the
FOCs only for the hybrid approaches.
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when working. The VOTlY i equals the VOTLY divided by the daily time endowment
because transferring one leisure hour on a leisure day into one working hour implies
turning the whole leisure day into a workday thereby considering commuting costs that
cannot be avoided. The full consumer price of consumption goods, P Y i, is the sum of the
gross price of the composite commodity plus monetary and time costs of the shopping
trip
P Y i =
uz

= p+ cz +

wn + (1  )

wn (e  t)  c
e

tz: (11)
Because shopping may occur on both types of days the time cost is the weighted average
of the VOT of an hour on a workday and the VOT of an hour on a leisure day, where the
weights are the shares of shopping trips on the respective type of day.
1.2.2 Inhomogeneous workhours approach (Hi)
In the inhomogeneous workhours approach daily working hours are endogenous but work-
days are given. The Lagrangian is equivalent to (7) except for the fact that we now write
D instead of D and that, due to the exogeneity of days, the yearly day restriction linked
to the Lagrangian multiplier  now drops. The VOT of an hour on a workday, VOTDHi,
the VOT of an hour on a leisure day, VOTlHi and the full consumer price of consumption
then are
VOTDHi:


= wn (12)
VOTlHi :
uL2

=


PHi =
uz

= p+ cz +
h
wn + (1  ) 

i
tz: (13)
1.2.3 Inhomogeneous workdays approach (Di)
In the inhomogeneous workdays approach daily working hours are given whereas work-
days can by chosen. The Lagrangian is (7) with h instead of h. Because h is xed the
opportunity cost of an hour of leisure on a workday cannot be equal to wn. The VOTs
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are
VOTDDi:
uL1

=


(14)
VOTLDi:


= wnh  c+ 

 
e  h  t (15)
VOTlDi:
uL2

=


=


1
e
=
wnh  c
e
+



e  h  t
e

: (16)
VOTL, i.e. the VOT of a leisure day, is the average daily net wage plus the time left
for leisure and shopping on a workday evaluated with VOTD, the value of leisure time
on a workday. The latter is present because leisure hours on a workday can be varied by
varying the number of shopping trips. The full consumer price of consumption is
PDi  uz

= p+ cz +
"



+ (1  )
 
wnh  c
e
+


 
e  h  t
e
!#
tz (17)
1.2.4 Homogeneous hybrid approach (Y h)
If preferences for leisure do not di¤er across types of leisure, it follows that uL1 = uL2 :
Then, in the presence of commuting costs, increasing hours on workdays is cheaper than
transferring one hour of leisure on leisure days into worktime (the latter requires an addi-
tional commuting trip). Thus, households will prefer raising working hours on workdays
as much as possible. We therefore need an additional restriction (lower bound) concern-
ing the number of leisure hours on a workday, `; and add the constraint `  ` with a
multiplier : The Lagrangian is
L = u

z; q;L1 + L2
`D+lL

+  f(wnh  c)D + I   (p+ cz) z   rqqg+  fE   L Dg (18)
+  feD   (h+ t)D   `D   tzzg+  feL  lL  (1  ) tzzg+   `  `D:
In this case, we have to distinguish two cases. However, as we show in Appendix B.2 ` > `
is not feasible, thus leisure is chosen so that it meets the lower bound, i.e. ` = `. The
VOTs with  as the shadow price of the leisure restriction are then (see Appendix B.2):
VOTDY h:


= wn (19)
VOTLY h:


=


+


= wne  (wnt+ c) e
e  ` (20)
VOTlY h:


=


1
e
= wn   w
nt+ c
e  ` . (21)
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The VOT of an hour on a leisure day, VOTlY h, is the VOT of an hour on a leisure day
diminished by full travel costs. However, in contrast to Y i (10) travel costs are relatively
more weighted due to the fact that less time is available for working, i.e. the leisure time
restriction is binding. The full consumer price is
P Y h  uz

= p+ cz +

wn + (1  )

wn   (w
nt+ c)
e  `

tz: (22)
1.2.5 Homogeneous workhours approach (Hh)
This approach is widely used in all the studies modeling endogenous working hours per
day and xed workdays (see Table 7 in Appendix A). From the Lagrangian (18) with D
instead of D and by dropping the yearly day restriction we obtain the uniform VOT of
an hour on a workday and a leisure day, respectively
VOTDHh = VOTlHh:


= wn =


(23)
and the full consumer price of consumption
PHh =
uz

= p+ cz + wntz: (24)
The value of an hour is just the hourly net wage. Since commuting costs xed costs in this
approach, they do not enter into the VOT. The allocation of consumption across types of
day doesnt matter since leisure is homogeneous, thus  does not appear in full consumer
price of consumption.
1.2.6 Homogeneous workdays approach (Dh)
Assuming that leisure is homogeneous and that workdays are endogenous whereas working
hours per day are xed is the common assumption of those studies listed in Table 8 of
Appendix A. From the Lagrangian (18) with h instead of h we get
VOTDDh = VOTlDh:


=


=
wnh  c
h+ t
(25)
VOTLDh:


=
wnh  c
h+ t
e (26)
PDh =
uz

= p+ cz +


tz = p+ cz + tz
wnh  c
h+ t
: (27)
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Because workdays and, thus, the number of commuting trips are now exible, the cost of
commuting become a variable cost in this approach. Therefore, full commuting costs do
enter inter the VOT and the value of an hour on a day is the disposable net wage after
monetary commuting cost and commuting time are taken into account. The numerator
in (25) is the disposable daily labor income and the denominator in (25) is the total time
needed to supply one full working day.
1.2.7 Summary of VOTs
Table 1: VOTs in di¤erent labor supply approaches
Approach u VOTD:  VOTL:

 VOTl:


Y i u (z; q;L1;L2) wn wne  (wnt+ c) wn   (w
nt+c)
e
Y h u (z; q;L) wn wne  (wnt+ c) e
e ` w
n   (wnt+c)
e `
Hi u (z; q;L1;L2) wn  
Hh u (z; q;L) wn  wn
Di u (z; q;L1;L2) uL1 =  wnh  c+ 
 
e  h  t  =  1e
Dh u (z; q;L) wnh ch+t w
nh c
h+t
e w
nh c
h+t
Table 2: Full consumer prices for shopping in di¤erent labor supply approaches
Approach u p+ cz +

  + (1  ) 

tz
Y i u (z; q;L1;L2) p+ cz +
h
wn + (1  ) wn(e t) ce
i
tz
Y h u (z; q;L) p+ cz +

wn + (1  )
h
wn   (wnt+c)
e `
i
tz
Hi u (z; q;L1;L2) p+ cz +

wn + (1  ) 

tz
Hh u (z; q;L) p+ cz + wntz
Di u (z; q;L1;L2) p+ cz +

  + (1  )

wnh c
e +


(e h t)
e

tz
Dh u (z; q;L) p+ cz + wnh ch+t tz
Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the VOTs and the full consumer prices of the di¤erent
labor supply approaches. As can be seen, the VOT of an hour on a workday is the same
in the hybrid and the workhours approach. However, there are di¤erences among the
approaches in all other VOTs and the full consumer prices.
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In Y h the change in travel costs (e.g. due to a congestion toll) has a stronger impact on
the VOT of a leisure day and, thus, might provoke stronger e¤ects on the number of days
compared with the Y i approach. Further changes will occur due to di¤erences in the full
consumer price.
A comparison of the homogeneous and the inhomogeneous workdays approach shows that
in Dh the daily net wage (the numerator of the VOT of leisure days) is evaluated with
e= (h+ t) > 1 and, thus the direct price e¤ects of higher travel cost is stronger than in
Di: This also a¤ects consumer prices. Hence, di¤erences in responses of workdays and
location choices between Di and Dh can be expected.
The consequences of these and further di¤erences for policy analyses is examined in the
following. We rst derive the welfare e¤ects of several policies aiming at reducing conges-
tion and, subsequently, we turn to the simulations.
2 The Welfare E¤ects of Congestion Policies
In the following we discuss the welfare e¤ects of ve di¤erent policies to alleviate con-
gestion: Pigouvian congestion tolls, a cordon toll, a miles tax, the investment in road
infrastructure capacities, and a land-use type regulation (zoning). The aim is to see
whether or not the labor supply approach a¤ects the outcome of these policies in a simi-
lar way. We, rst, complete the model and derive marginal welfare e¤ects of these policies.
Further, we derive optimal policies and discuss the e¤ect of labor supply modeling. For
lack of space here we focus on the congestion toll for exposition. We use the inhomoge-
neous hybrid approach (Y i) as starting point for our exposition because it is the most
general model without any restrictions on the choice of leisure and labor.
2.1 Closing the Model
Each household decides on its spatial choice set ij that maximizes its expected util-
ity. Since "ij is stochastically distributed among households for each ij, a households
probability for choosing ij is 	ij = Pr

Vij + "ij > Vi~j + "i~j, 8 i~j 6= ij

. We assume that
"ij is i.i.d.Gumbel distributed with mean zero, variance 2 and dispersion parameter
 = =
 

p
6

. This implies that the choice probabilities are given by the multinomial
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logit model (e.g. Small and Rosen, 1981; Anas and Rhee, 2006)
	ij =
exp (Vij)
JP
a=1
JP
b=1
exp (Vab)
. (28)
Output of local consumption goods is Xi = f (Qi;Mi). It is produced by a representative
rm applying a constant returns to scale production function with aggregate land demand
Qi and labor demand Mi.
The government levies a wage tax w, a miles (distance) tax m per unit of distance,
Pigouvian congestion tolls  ti per trip on a congested route and a cordon toll for entering
zone 1, the City,  c. Public expenditures comprise opportunity cost of road infrastructure
risiAi where Ai is the total available land area in zone i and si is the share of land in
zone i allocated to road infrastructure. The government balances its budget either by
adjusting w (hereafter referred to as labor tax recycling) or by granting/levying a per
capita lump-sum transfers/tax  ls (total transfer/tax payment then is T ls = N ls).6 The
budget constraint of the government is
wTw +
X
i
 tiT
t
i + 
mTm +  cT c +  lsN =
X
i
risiAi (29)
where the tax bases are (assuming shopping occurs during o¤-peak time and does not add
to congestion)
Tw  N
X
i
X
j
	ijwjhijDij (30)
T ti  Fi = N
X
j
	ijDij +N
X
j 6=i
	jiDji (31)
Tm  N
X
i
X
j
	ijmijDij +N
X
i
X
j
	ij
X
k
mikzijk (32)
T c  N
X
i
X
j 6=i
	ijDij +N
X
i
X
j
	ij
X
k 6=i
mikzijk: (33)
and
Fi  N
X
j
	ijDij +N
X
j 6=i
	jiDji (34)
is commuting tra¢ c ow during the peak hours in zone i. It is used to calculate equilibrium
6If wTw +
P
i 
t
i T
t
i + 
mTm +  cT c >
P
i risiAi; i.e. aggregate tax revenue exceeds expenditure, then
 ls < 0 is a transfer, otherwise it is tax.
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(congested) travel times fi = Fi=Ki, where road capacity
Ki = siAi. (35)
is proportional to the land area allocated to roads with  as road capacity scale parameter
used to calibrate reasonable levels of congestion.
Local land, labor and consumption goods markets clearing requires
Ai = Qi +N
X
j
	ijqij + siAi; 8i (36)
N
X
i
	ijhijDij = Mj; 8j (37)
Xk = N
X
i
X
j
	ijzijk; 8k; (38)
where the left-hand side represents supply and the right-hand side corresponding demand.
In the case of zoning there are two local land markets in each zone: one for residen-
tial use such that i (1  si)Ai = N
P
j 	ijqij and the other for business use implying
(1  i) (1  si)Ai = Qi, where  is the share of land available for residences. Eventually,
we dene aggregate land rents (ARL)
ALR  N
X
i
X
j
	ijriqi +
X
i
rqiQi +
X
i
risiAi. (39)
2.2 Marginal welfare e¤ect
Welfare is calculated as the expected value of the maximized utilities (see Small and
Rosen, 1981, Anas and Rhee, 2006). Under the assumption that idiosyncratic tastes "ij
for a specic location choice set ij are i.i.d. Gumbel distributed, welfare is
W = E

max(ij) (Vij + "ij)

=
1

ln
X
i
X
j
exp (Vij) . (40)
The marginal welfare e¤ect of a Pigouvian congestion toll levied in zone k then is
dW
d tk
= N
X
i
X
j
	ij
dVij
d tk
. (41)
After using public budget constraint (29), the zero prot conditions and the market
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clearing conditions (38)(36) and manipulating, we obtain the marginal welfare e¤ect of
levying a Pigouvian toll levies in zone k assuming for the time being that the government
uses lump-sum tax recycling (see Appendix C):7
1

dW
d tk
=

MECt    tk
Adjt
 dF=d ti

 dF
d ti

+ TI t +REt (42)
where marginal external congestion costs are (withdtij
d ti
= t0i
dFi
d ti
+ ijt
0
j
dFj
d ti
)
MECt =
N

X
i
X
j
	ijijDij
dtij=d
t
i
dF=d ti
, (43)
and
 
X
i
X
j
	ijij. (44)
the average (expected) marginal utility of income.
The marginal welfare e¤ect of an anti-congestion policy depends on the net social marginal
costs plus tax interaction plus redistribution e¤ects. The latter arise due to di¤erences
in the marginal utility of income. If we consider labor tax recycling instead of lump-sum
tax recycling, an additional tax recycling e¤ect would be present.
To interpret welfare changes with respect to congestion tolls we have to specify the terms
in (42). First, welfare depends on the net social marginal costs ,i.e. the di¤erence between
marginal external congestion costs and the weighted congestion toll

MECt    tk Adj
t
 dF=d ti

.
With a Pigouvian toll this term vanishes.
Tax interaction, redistribution and adjustment terms are, respectively,
TI t  wN
X
i
X
j

	ijwjhij
dDij
d tk
+ 	ijwjDij
dhij
d tk
+ wjhijDij
d	ij
d tk

(45)
REt MECt

dF
d tk
 
E   1+ Y t  Y   1 NX
i
X
j
	ij
kDij
 
T   1 (46)
7Derivations for the other policies are available upon request from the authors.
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Adjt   
X
i
X
j
k

	ij
dDij
d tk
+Dij
d	ij
d tk

(47)
+N
X
i 6=k
 ti
"X
j

	ij
dDij
d tk
+Dij
d	ij
d tk

+N
X
j 6=i

	ji
dDji
d k
+Dji
d	ji
d k
#
dFi
d tk
= N
X
j

	ij
dDij
d tk
+Dij
d	ij
d tk

+N
X
j

	ji
dDji
d tk
+Dji
d	ji
d tk

(48)
dF
d tk
= N
X
i
X
j

	ij
dDij
d tk
+Dij
d	ij
d tk

+N
X
i
X
j 6=i

	ij
dDij
d tk
+Dij
d	ij
d tk

; (49)
indicator k is unity if i or j equals k and zero otherwise. The distribution characteristics
 (see Feldstein, 1972) are dened in (115). All terms, except for RE and TI include
changes in workdays and location only. Even changes in travel times depend on changes
in tra¢ c ows that are determined by changes in workdays and location. In contrast, the
tax interaction e¤ect (TI) depends also on working hours.
From (50) in connection with (45) - (48) we can deduce the following:
Proposition 1 In a workhours approach the welfare e¤ects of Pigouvian congestion tolls
are only determined by relocation and changes in daily working hours.
Proof. Set dDij=d = 0 in (49) and (48). Then, all terms (except for TI ) exclusively
include relocation e¤ects.
Further, in Y h;Di andDh all components of the welfare change, except for redistribution,
depend only on changes in workdays and relocation. The impact on working hours appears
only in Y i, Hi and Hh. Hence, we expect that Y i implies results closer to the workhours
approaches (Hi, Hh) while the Y h delivers numbers more similar to the results of the
workdays approach (Di;Dh).
Proposition 2 (No relocation). Assume there are prohibiting spatial relocation costs and
tax interaction as well as redistribution e¤ects do not exist. Then in workhours approaches
(Hi;Hh) MEC is zero implying no direct e¤ect of tolls on social welfare. In contrast MEC
deviates from zero in the hybrid approaches (Y i; Y h) and workdays approaches (Di, Dh)
if there is a small change in the number of workdays. This is even true if there are is no
relocation. Then, social welfare is a¤ected by congestion tolls.
Proof. If d	=d tk = 0 and since D = D it follows from (49)that dtij=d
t
k = 0 and from
(43) that MECt = 0. If dDij=d tk 6= 0 then dtij=d tk 6= 0 and MEC tk 6= 0.
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This result implies that in cities where many of households do not really have the option
to move to the inner city, e.g. due to high housing prices, or due to negative costs such
as loss of neighbors, fear for crime etc., e¤ects of both approaches are expected to di¤er
signicantly.
We can also derive some tentative conclusions concerning the number of commuting trips
(workdays): Assume workdays are endogenous and the rst-round e¤ect of the toll on the
VOT of a workday dominates indirect price e¤ects via the markets. Then the VOT of a
workday declines. If, in addition, substitution e¤ects dominate, the number of workdays
declines (dDij=d tk < 0). In contrast, if working hours are endogenous, there is no direct
e¤ect of the toll on the VOT because there is only an income e¤ect. With lump-sum
tax recycling this e¤ect is neutralized on average if we neglect market based changes.
But household types facing high congestion tolls have a larger tax liability than com-
muters facing low tolls. As a consequence, working hours of highly taxed households
might increase (dhij=d tk > 0, if 
t
kDij >
 ls) and those of low taxed households decline
(dhij=d tk < 0, if 
t
kDij <
 ls). In addition, households can avoid high net taxation
by relocating. This implies a decline in traveling on highly congested routes and an in-
crease in traveling on less congested routes. Assume congestion is high on the city-city
and suburb-city link, then we would expect spatial resorting from households of type ii
(city-city) to ij (city-suburb).
Furthermore, because in the end relocation adds up to zero
P
ij	ij = 1

, the e¤ect of
relocation on revenues from other taxes is expected to be low. Hence, responses of labor
supply mainly determine the sign of the tax interaction term (45). Because the change in
labor supply as a response to congestion tolls is theoretically ambiguous in the workdays
approach (due to countervailing substitution and income e¤ects), the tax interaction e¤ect
and associated with it its impact on welfare is likely to be di¤erent across labor supply
approaches.
Referring to congestion we know that workdays are complementary to the number of
commuting trips. Hence, the decline in workdays lowers commuting. However, as the level
of congestion declines, commuting costs decline and the number of workdays increase. This
induces additional congestion, diminishing the returns from internalization. Therefore, in
the workdays approaches welfare is expected to increase less than in workhours approaches
(Hi;Hh) due to the internalization e¤ect.
From setting the marginal welfare change to zero and solving for  tk we can derive the
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optimal Pigouvian toll in zone k :
 
 tk

=
MECt
Adjt

 dF
d ti

| {z }
(+)
+
TI t
Adjt| {z }
( )
+
REt
Adjt| {z }
(?)
: (50)
This formula implies that optimal congestion tolls are spatially di¤erentiated except for
the unlikely case that the sum of the terms are equal for each tax. Because tra¢ c ows
and labor supply decline with a marginal increase in the toll, the rst two terms in the
optimal tax formula (50) are of opposite sign. Nothing can be said about redistribution.
Hence, optimal tax rates are ambiguous. If redistribution is avoided due to transfers
equalizing marginal utility of incomes, RE vanishes. Then, if congestion would be the
only distortion (neither further externalities nor distortionary taxes ) the Pigouvian tolls
represent the rst best solution.
2.3 Conclusions from theory
As theory shows welfare e¤ects of transportation policy do not only depend on marginal
congestion costs but also on tax interaction, tax recycling and redistribution e¤ects. Fur-
ther, similar formula can be derived for miles taxes and a cordon toll. In case of land-use
type regulation, the tax distortion due to the tax instrument does not exist and, instead,
a land market distortion is added that does not directly depend on labor supply (see
Appendix C.3). Hence, the e¤ects of the labor supply approach are expected to be much
smaller under land-use regulation. In general, the magnitude and the direction of the
policies considered might depend on the labor supply approach modeled.
3 Simulations
In the following we provide a wide range of simulations to verify the impacts of di¤erences
in the labor supply approaches considered. The theoretical analysis is now extended to
a spatial urban computable general equilibrium model involving the interactions between
city households, rms, absentee landowners, and the (city) government. The simulation
model is structurally and formally identical to the theoretical model with some exceptions.
We have to specify utility and production functions, also allow for absentee landownership
and close the model with a current account. Due to the similarity, we now only explain
the novel model features and specify functional forms.
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Our strategy is as follows: We rst simulate welfare changes for the di¤erent labor supply
approaches including further variations in important model specications. This we use
to compare the six models and to draw rst conclusions. To nd more conclusions we,
afterwards, present more detailed results for a case where welfare e¤ects are relatively
close to each other.
3.1 Functional forms and model closure
In the inhomogeneous leisure approach the concrete utility function of household type
fijg is
Uij = u (zij; qij;Lij1;Lij2) + "ij = z lnZij + q ln qij + L1 ln (`ijDij) + L2 ln (lijLij) + "ij;
(51)
whereas in the homogeneous leisure approach it is
Uij = u (zij; qij;Lij1 + Lij2) + "ij = z lnZij +q ln qij +L ln (`ijDij + lijLij) + "ij; (52)
where Zij =
X
k
(zijk)

1=
represents the CES subutility function for consumption
reecting spatial taste variety in shopping (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). Hence, consumers
want to shop everywhere (index k denotes the shopping location), but the number of
trips made to stores/retailers at a particular location attenuates with an increase in the
full cost of that trip, where 1=(1  ) is the elasticity of substitution regarding shopping
locations. z; q; and L denote preferences for consumption of general goods, housing,
and leisure, respectively. In the inhomogeneous leisure approach, the preference for leisure
is di¤erentiated between preference for leisure on workdays
 
L1

and on leisure days
 
L2

:
In each zone i a su¢ ciently large number of rms produce zone-specic commodities Xi
by applying a Cobb-Douglas technology that combines land and labor.
Xi = BiQ
!Qi
i M
!Mi
i : (53)
B is the the productivity (scale-) parameter, !Qi is the zone-specic output elasticity with
respect to land, and !Mi is the zone-specic output elasticity with respect to labor. We
assume constant returns to scale, thus i + i = 18i.
In line with Anas and Xu (1999) as well as Anas and Rhee (2006) the time ti needed to
travel one mile in zone i is determined by the BPR (bureau of public roads) congestion
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function
ti = g0

1 + g1

Fi
Ki
g2
; (54)
where g1, g2 > 0; gi is the inverse of the free of congestion tra¢ c speed; Fi is tra¢ c ow
in zone i and Ki = isiAi denotes the exogenously given road capacity (see (35)). Since
Ti = tiFi hours per mile are spent by the tra¢ c in zone i where Fi is overall zone-specic
tra¢ c ow, the marginal social time cost is @Ti=@Fi = t0iFi + ti and, accordingly, the
congestion externality [hours/mile] is
t0i = g0g1g2

Fi
Ki
g2
: (55)
Furthermore, because we allow for absentee landownership, nancial outows to the ab-
sentee landowners must be balanced by zone-specic export quantities  i determined by
a balance of payment. The balance of payment
pi i = i
h
(1 )
X2
i=1
riAi
i
(56)
ensures that land rents paid to absentee landowners (right-hand side) equal the value of
exported commodities, where is the share of residential land owned by urban households.
Distributing aggregate nancial outows [] to zone i by setting the export share of zone
i at i;where i > 0 and
X2
i=1
i = 1; allows determining zone-specic export quantities
 i:
8
Because of export ows we need to adjust the zone-specic good market clearing condition
(displayed in (38)) by adding export quantities (outside demand) on the demand side,
yielding
Xk = N
X
i
X
j
	ijZijk +  k: (57)
Absentee landowners are assumed to use their rent dividend income, Y A = (1 )
X
i
riAi;
to buy commodities produced and supplied in the city at mill price pi. Assuming that their
preferences are represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function with uniform expenditure
shares across the city zones, the utility function is UA = uA
 
zA1 ; z
A
2

= (1=2)
P
i ln z
A
i .
Maximizing utility subject to the monetary budget constraint then gives indirect utility
VA = ln
1
2
+ lnY A   1
2
(
P
i ln pi) :
8For simplicity we assume that commodities can be exported at zero transport costs.
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3.2 Parameters and benchmark simulation
We choose parameters to reproduce characteristics of a prototype medium-sized U.S.
metropolitan area. Table 3 displays the parameter values used to simulate the bench-
mark (pre-policy) urban economy for the inhomogeneous as well as the homogeneous
leisure approaches, and Table 4 shows the (endogenous) outcome of the benchmark simu-
lation in the inhomogeneous leisure approaches.9 We consider the polycentric as well as a
monocentric city, where the CBD allows for mixed land-use while suburbs are residential
areas.
We assume a medium-sized U.S. metropolitan area inhabited by N = 500; 000 households.
The total available land area
P
iAi is taken to be 290 square miles. Assuming an average
household size of 2.5 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012) this implies an overall population density
of around 4300 persons per square mile. We reasonably assume that the road network
is denser in the city compared to the suburbs and thus set the shares of land allocated
roads at s1 = 0:45 and s2 = 0:20:
Travel distances are lowest for intra-city level (8 miles per one-way trip) and highest for
inter-urban travel (24 miles per one-way trip). Along with evidence on parameters for
the BPR congestion function (Small and Verhoef, 2007), this gives realistic travel and
congestion patterns in the urban area. Average one-way commuting time is 31 minutes
per trip,10 total annual time delay per commuter is 31 hours per year11 and averaged
marginal external cost amounts to 22.$-cents/mile.12
Parameters in the utility function were set to obtain real-world expenditure shares for
consumption and housing, and, in particular to reproduce time allocation patterns ac-
cording to the American Time Use Survey. For example, pure time spent working on a
9We rst simulated the hybrid labor supply approach where workdays per year as well as workhours per
day are endogenously determined. Subsequently, the number of workdays (workhours) was then used
as exogenous parameter in workhours (workdays) approach, thereby resulting in the same benchmark.
Therefore benchmark (pre-policy) outcomes presented in Table 4 apply to the inhomogeneous hybrid,
workdays and workhours approach. We refrain from also discussing the benchmark of the homogeneous
leisure approach since outcomes are basically comparable.
10For comparison, average one-way commuting time in U.S. MSAs is as follows (U.S. Census Bureau,
2011): 35 min (New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA); 33 min (Washington-
Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV); 31 min (Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI); 30 min
(Winchester, VA-WV); 30 min (Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA).
11According to the 2012 Urban Mobility Report the yearly (2011) delay per auto commuter amounted to
29 hours (on average) in medium sized MSAs; 23 hours in small MSAs (less than 500,000 population);
and 37 hours in large MSAs (over 1 million and less than 3 million population).
12Parry and Small (2009) report peak-period marginal external congestion of 21 $-cents/mile for Wash-
ington, DC and 26 $-cents/mile for Los Angeles.
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Table 3: Benchmark parameters
Description Notation Value
City characteristics
Total available land area [square mile] city/suburb Ai 58=232
Travel distance [miles] citycity m11 8
Travel distance [miles] citysuburb m12 24 ( )1
Travel distance [miles] suburbcity m21 24
Travel distance [miles] suburbsuburb m22 16 ( )1
Share of land allocated to roads city/suburb si 0:45=0:20
Consumption good price in the city (numeraire) p1 50 $
Export share zone i i i = 1=2 8i (1 = 1)1
Households
Number of households/residents/workers (full city) N 500; 000
Time endowment (days per year) E 315
Time endowment (hours per day) e 16
Preference consumption/shopping z 0:37
Preference housing q 0:27
Preference (homogeneous) leisure L 0:36
Preference (inhomogeneous) leisure on workdays L1 0:26
Preference (inhomogeneous) leisure on leisure days L2 0:10
Share of shopping trips on workdays  0:50
Taste for shopping variety  0:6 ( )1
Spatial location taste heterogeneity  3
Share urban landownership  0:3
Labor tax rate w 0:35
Firms
Labor cost share (output elasticity) city/suburb !Mi 0:90=0:70 (0:90= )1
Land cost share (output elasticity) city/suburb !Qi 0:10=0:30 (0:10= )1
Scale (productivity) parameter production function B 0:70 ( )1
Transport
Free ow travel time per mile g0 1=40 h
Parameter congestion function g1 2:0
Parameter congestion function g2 5:0
Road capacity scale parameter  0:68 (1:30)1
1 In parentheses: monocentric city parameters
working day amounts to 8.3 hours in the benchmark13 while time spent in leisure activi-
ties is 5.8 hours. The remaining around 2 hours are used for traveling. The distribution
of the annual time endowment E is 263=52: In the benchmark the number of shopping
trips per year is larger than the number of commutes reecting empirical evidence on the
increasing importance of-non-work related trips in regard to individual mobility patterns
(Anas, 2007).
We assume that the labor cost share of city rms is higher whereas the land cost share
13The U.S. Department of Labor/Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013a) reports average workhours of em-
ployed full time persons who worked on an average weekday of 8.5 (only men: 8.8; only women 8.1).
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Table 4: Outcome of the benchmark simulation (inhomogeneous leisure approach)
Polycentric City
Time allocation
Workdays per year 263
Leisure days per year 52
Hours on a workday spent working/leisure 8.3/5.8
Hours on a workday spent/commuting/shopping 1.1/0.8
Hours on a leisure day spent leisure/shopping 12.0/4.0
Total labor supply [hours/year] 2187
Total leisure demand [hours/year] 2164
Total commuting time on workdays [hours/year] 272
Total shopping time [hours/year] 417
Travel/Transport/Tra¢ c
Travel time delay [hours/year] 31
Marginal external congestion cost [$-cents/mile] 22
Total travel time [hours/year] 689
One-way commuting time [minutes] 31
Value of time of one hour on a workday [$/hour] 13.87
Value of time of one hour on a leisure day [$/hour] 12.97
Commuting trip pattern [million/year] citycity 25.4
Commuting trip pattern [million/year] citysuburb 19.3
Commuting trip pattern [million/year] suburbcity 45.0
Commuting trip pattern [million/year] suburbsuburb 41.6
Households
Gross income [$/year] 61,071
Consumption (shopping) [trips/year] 472
Average housing demand [sqr feet] 7778
Urban Economy
Total urban production [million units] 556.7
Urban GDP [billion $/year] 29.1
Rent city/suburb [$/sqr feet*year] 5.95/2.22
Wage rate city/suburb [$/hour] 22.81/19.65
Government
Labor tax revenue [million $/year] 8171
Lump-sum tax revenue [million $/year] 974
Infrastructure costs [million $/year] 7197
Location
Households city 168,687
Households suburb 331,313
Jobs city 268,099
Jobs suburb 231,901
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is lower compared to suburban rms. This is to reect that land intensive rms usually
prefer to produce at suburban locations while labor intensive (management related) jobs
are more heavily concentrated in the city. Along with residential and employment location
decisions of workers, this gives reasonable wage and rent proles. For example, the average
wage rate in the whole urban area amounts to 21.34 $/hour (22.81 $/hour in the city and
19.65 $/hour in the suburbs).14
The spatial location taste heterogeneity parameter was adjusted in such a way so that
population and employment densities peak in the city and that the jobhousing balance
(ratio of the number of jobs in zone i to the number of employed persons in zone i) exceeds
unity in the city and falls short of unity in the suburbs.15
3.3 E¤ects of policies numerical results
3.3.1 Overview
We run simulations in regard to ve transportation policies: (1) introduction of a Pigou-
vian congestion toll, (2) a road infrastructure capacity expansion, (3) a miles tax of
0.05 $/mile, (4) a cordon toll of $10 for entering the city, and (5) land-use type regulation
implying an increase in residential land in the city by 4 percentage points and a decline
in suburbs by 4 percentage points. We consider these policies to be of reasonable size.
For each policy we consider all six labor supply approaches and in addition, di¤erentiate
with respect to revenue recycling (lump-sum vs. labor tax recycling) and landownership
( mixed landownership, only absentee landowners and only local landowners). Table 5
displays equivalent variations (EV) of these policies in comparison to the benchmark in
million USD per year. To get an idea of the size of the e¤ects note that 100 million $ is
about 1.4% of benchmark net tax revenue and 0.3% of benchmark urban GDP.
14For comparison, according to the U.S. Department of Labor/Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013b), the
mean hourly wage rate for all occupations amounted to $22.33 $/hour in May 2013.
15For empirical evidence see, e.g. Cox (2013), Levine (1998), or Sultana (2002).
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These data reveal several results for the polycentric city16
 In only 15 out of the 30 variants (or 32 out of 60 if we consider model versions)
calculated for each of the labor supply approaches the sign of the welfare change
is uniform. This shows, that not only the magnitude but also the direction of the
policy e¤ect depends on the labor supply approach chosen.
 for example considering price based policies, in the homogeneous leisure ap-
proach and with lump-sum tax funding, large losses in approaches with endoge-
nous workdays (Dh; Y h) turn into gains when workdays become xed (Hh):
 In almost all scenarios, welfare e¤ects of the hybrid approach are in between both
extremelabor supply approaches.
 Labor tax recycling produces higher benets than lump sum tax recycling. The
reason is the positive tax recycling e¤ect (see above).
 Considering economic instruments (price based policies),
 in the inhomogeneous leisure approach and with labor tax recycling, EVs in
the hybrid (Y i) and the workhours (Hi) approach are very similar, while
 in the homogeneous leisure approach and with lump-sum tax recycling, EVs
in the hybrid (Y h) and the workdays (Dh) approach produce almost the same
welfare e¤ects.
 Considering planning instruments (road capacity expansion and LUR), all labor
supply approaches result in similar welfare e¤ects.
16By adjusting a few parameter values (see Table 3) we also calculated the e¤ects for a mononectric city.
We nd that the basic impacts of labor supply modeling on policy e¤ects we discuss hereafter for the
polycentric city also hold for the monocentric city. The main di¤erence is that welfare di¤erentials
caused by variations in labor supply modeling are stronger in the monocentric city case. Therefore,
certain patterns found for the polycentric city tend to be even more robust in the monocentric city
case. The reason is that in the monocentric city with mixed land-use in the CBD only the choice
sets ii (city-city), and ji (suburb-city) are feasible. In this case households will respond to policies
(e.g. congestion tolls) by relocating to the CBD in the workours approaches (Hi;Hh), but by both 
relocating to the city and changing labor days in the other approaches. In contrast, in a polycentric
urban area even the choice set jj (suburb-suburb) is feasible, making the workhours approach less
restrictive. In the monocentric city the impacts of the di¤erent labor supply approaches are therefore
more distinctive than in the polycentric city case. We therefore restrict our exposition to the polycentric
city case, keeping in mind that our conclusions on the importance of labor modeling also hold for the
monocentric city case.
26
 for example, road capacity expansion is unambiguously welfare reducing across
all labor supply approaches and regardless of whether leisure is homogeneous
or inhomogeneous. Here, the negative e¤ect of nancing is dominant.
To get a clearer idea why this happens, we now look into some details of the results.
We rst study the inhomogeneous case with lump-sum tax recycling which provides the
smallest di¤erences among the di¤erent models.
3.3.2 Detailed e¤ects
In order to gure out fundamental characteristics that drive the di¤erences among the
labor supply approaches, let us exemplarily pick up case 1a, i.e. the case of introducing
the Pigouvian congestion toll with lump-sum tax recycling in the inhomogeneous leisure
case.17 Table 6 displays the simulation results where numbers are deviations from the
benchmark printed in column 2).
Before we refer to the di¤erences in the e¤ects that can be traced back to the di¤erent labor
supply approaches, let us discuss some general e¤ects of the congestion toll policy which
should be consistent with intuition and, of course, the e¤ects suggested by the literature.
Let us check this through two indicators: the toll induced change in congestion levels and
changes in location decisions.
First, in all approaches, introducing congestion pricing reduces congestion levels, travel
time delays and marginal congestion costs decline (see row (10) and (11)). The congestion
toll is highest (7.33 $/trip) where most commutes appear (trips originating in the suburbs
and terminating in the city) whereas it is almost zero in the reverse direction. Second,
levying congestion tolls increases population densities in the city where the majority of
jobs exists. Commuters urbanize in order to economize on higher commuting costs which
is consistent with the classical urban economics theory (see row (35)). We also nd that in
contrast to residents, jobs suburbanize since land used as input by rms becomes relatively
cheaper in the suburbs (see row (38)). This is consistent with the literature dealing with
polycentric cities (see Anas and Xu, 1999).
Now let discuss di¤erences in the e¤ects of the policy that stem from di¤erences in the
way labor supply is modeled.
As can be seen, though labor supply e¤ects are small in magnitude, the total number
17Detailed e¤ects of the other policies and with same charatersistics (i.e. versions 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a according
to the nomenclature in Table 5) are listed in Tables 10-13 in Appendix D.
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Table 6: Policy e¤ects of Pigouvian congestion tolls with inhomogenous leisure
Pigouvian congestion toll - Case 1a Benchmark Hours Hi Hybrid Y i Days Di
Time allocation
(1) Workdays per year 263 0  1  1
(2) Leisure days per year 52 0 +1 +1
(3) Hours on a workday spent working/leisure 8.3/5.8/ 0/0 +0.1/0 0/+0.1
(4) Hours on a workday spent/commuting/shopping 1.1/0.8 0/0  0.1/0  0.1/0
(5) Hours on a leisure day spent leisure/shopping 12.0/4.0 +0.1/ 0.1 +0.1/ 0.1 +0.1/ 0.1
(6) Total labor supply [hours/year] 2187 +6  2  6
(7) Total leisure demand [hours/year] 2164 +3 +12 +17
(8) Total commuting time on workdays [hours/year] 272  6  8  7
(9) Total shopping time [hours/year] 417  3  3  4
Travel/Transport/Tra¢ c
(10) Travel time delay [hours/year] 31  5  5  5
(11) MECC [$-cents/mile] 22  3  4  3
(12) Total travel time [hours/year] 689  9  10  11
(13) One-way commuting time [minutes] 31  1  1  1
(14) VOT of one hour on a workday [$/hour] 13.87  0.16  0.15  0.35
(15) Commuting trips [million/year] citycity 25.4 +0.4 +0.3 +0.4
(16) Commuting trips [million/year] citysuburb 19.3 +0.6 +0.5 +0.2
(17) Commuting trips [million/year] suburbcity 45.0  2.0  2.2  1.9
(18) Commuting trips [million/year] suburbsuburb 41.6 +1.0 +0.8 +0.8
(19) Congestion toll [$/trip] citycity 0.0 1.54 1.51 1.50
(20) Congestion toll [$/trip] citysuburb 0.0 0.16 0.15 0.14
(21) Congestion toll [$/trip] suburbcity 0.0 7.33 7.22 7.35
(22) Congestion toll [$/trip] suburbsuburb 0.0 2.13 2.09 2.04
Households
(23) Gross income [$/year] 61,071  460  632  1,136
(24) Consumption (shopping) [trips/year] 472 0  1  2
(25) Average housing demand [sqr feet] 7778  55  58  77
Urban Economy
(26) Total urban production [million units] 556.7 +0.1  0.4  1.5
(27) Urban GDP [billion $/year] 29.1  0.2  0.3  0.5
(28) EV [million $/year]  +43 +16  17
(29) Rent city/suburb [$/sqr feet*year] 5.95/2.22 +0.12/ 0.05 +0.09/ 0.05 +0.08/ 0.08
(30) Wage rate city/suburb [$/hour] 22.81/19.65  0.05/ 0.39  0.04/ 0.36  0.04/ 0.62
Government
(31) Labor tax revenue [million $/year] 8171  65  87  155
(32) Lump-sum tax revenue [million $/year] 974  817  804  791
(33) Congestion toll revenue [million $/year] 0 +897 +880 +890
(34) Infrastructure costs [million $/year] 7197 +15  13  56
Location
(35) Households city 168,687 +3,745 +3,687 +2,882
(36) Households suburb 331,313  3,745  3,687  2,882
(37) Jobs city 268,099  6,356  6,313  4,971
(38) Jobs suburb 231,901 +6,356 +6,313 +4,971
28
of working hours per year increases in the workhours approach whereas it decreases in
the hybrid (Y i) and the workdays (Di) approach. The latter e¤ect of a decrease in total
labor supply is driven by the reduction in workdays as response to the congestion toll and
thus to higher commuting costs. This implies that in both labor supply approaches where
workdays are endogenous, (Y i and Di) the substitution e¤ect (leisure becomes cheaper
due to the toll, see also Table 1) outweighs the income e¤ect (leisure is a normal good),
causing an overall reduction in labor supply. In addition, working hours per day increase
which is consistent with theory (see also Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2010)
because workers have an incentive to reduce the number of workdays to avoid additional
commuting costs, and then to increase daily supply to avoid a reduction in income.
Furthermore, even though households urbanize as a response to congestion tolls in all
labor supply approaches, there is a signicant di¤erence. The relocation e¤ect is weakest
in the workdays approach where workers can respond to congestion not only by relocation,
e.g. changing the residential location to avoid commuting pattern suburb-city, but can also
adjust the number of commuting trips. In contrast, the relocation e¤ect is strongest in
the workhours approach, where the only choice for commuters to avoid paying the toll is
to relocate, thus avoiding highly tolled commuting patterns. That is, the more exible
commuters may adjust commuting trips, the weaker relocation e¤ects, or to put it in
another way, relocation is stronger in labor supply approaches with endogenous working
hours.
Interestingly, the decline in congestion levels is almost the same across all labor supply
approaches. Travel time delays decline by about 16% (see row (10)) and marginal external
congestion costs by about 15% (see row (11)) in all approaches. This implies that stronger
relocation e¤ects (Hi) almost exactly o¤set the additional adjustment in workdays in the
other approaches (Y i;Di). Hence, concerning congestion the labor supply regime doesnt
matter provided relocation is considered. There is also no clear pattern of di¤erences in
toll rates across the three labor supply approaches. The reason is that the Pigouvian
toll in the simulation is equal to the marginal congestion cost at equilibrium and thus
distribution and tax interaction e¤ects present in the optimal toll formula (50) are not
able to generate signicant toll di¤erences. A general result is therefore that a Pigouvian
toll is unambiguously an e¤ective instrument for lowering congestion externalities in the
long term regardless of how commuters are able to adjust their labor supply.18
Comparing welfare e¤ects of the policy (see row (28)) it can be seen that case 1a is
18Note that Table 6 refers to simulation 1a (see Table 5), i.e. lumps-sum tax recycling with mixed landown-
ership. However, e¤etcs on congestion are similar across all congestion toll policy simualtions.
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one of the cases where welfare e¤ects di¤er not only in magnitude between labor supply
approaches, but, more importantly, also with respect to the direction. In the workdays
approach, the Pigouvian toll reduces welfare, while in the other approaches it enhances
welfare. As a consequence, recycling revenues from congestion pricing e¢ ciently through
cuts in distortionary labor taxes is not a requirement to generate positive welfare e¤ects
in the inhomogeneous workhours and hybrid approach, but it is in the inhomogeneous
workdays approach.
3.3.3 Generalization of ndings
Recall that one of the main conclusions derived from Table 5 was that when considering
price based policies,
 in the inhomogeneous leisure approach and with labor tax recycling, welfare e¤ects
in the hybrid (Y i) and the workhours (Hi) approach are very similar, while
 in the homogeneous leisure approach and with lump-sum tax recycling, welfare
e¤ects in the hybrid (Y h) and the workdays (Dh) approach produce almost the
same welfare e¤ects.
Because these conclusions are drawn from specic policies, e.g. a miles tax of 0.05 $/mile
or a cordon toll of $10 per trip, it is essential to analyze whether these ndings hold for
a wide range of policies as well. Figure 1 presents the welfare e¤ects di¤erent levels of
the miles tax and cordon toll rate. The run of the welfare curves suggest that indeed
ndings are quite robust. The gure also reveals that optimal policy levels are usually
higher in the workhours approach, while at the optimal policy level, welfare gains are
larger (respectively there are welfare gains at all).
3.3.4 Recommendations
Given the missing empirical evidence on the actual labor supply behavior, the hybrid
approach is suggested to be the bestchoice because it takes into account endogenous
working hours as well as endogenous workdays and thus avoids the restrictive assumption
of xed working hours or xed workdays. A comparison of its results with those of the
workhours and the workdays approaches reveals which kind of labor supply adjustment
is more signicant when applying a specic policy. Based on the results of our analyses
we derive some recommendations on which of the modeling approaches might provide a
useful shortcut to the hybrid approach.
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Figure 1: Welfare e¤ects of congestion pricing policies
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Economics instruments, homogeneous leisure
The above results suggest that with homogeneous leisure Dh is a good approximation
of Y h while Hh provides results that strongly deviate from both approaches. However,
welfare variations around the optimal policies are small in Hh, so that the ndings of
Y h or Dh concerning optimal taxes are also acceptable from the point of view of the
Hh approach. Because Y h considers both endogenous working hours and endogenous
workdays, it is the more general approach. Given the missing empirical evidence on the
actual behavior concerning labor supply, the Y h approach should be the rst choice.
Since in the case of homogeneous leisure the Dh approach provides a very close welfare
approximation of the Y h approach, we recommend applying the Dh approach in studies
on tax policies when leisure is homogeneous.
Economics instruments, inhomogeneous leisure, lump-sum tax recycling
Here Y i provides ndings in between the pure workdays and the pure workhours ap-
proaches. We therefore recommend to apply hybrid models. However, the impact of tax
policies is lower than with the homogeneous approaches (see Table 5) because leisure on
leisure days is a weaker substitute to leisure on workdays and, thus, labor supply responses
are likely to be smaller. For this reason, possible misinterpretation occurring when ap-
plying either approach are likely to be relatively small. Accordingly, the modeler is free
to decide.
Economics instruments, inhomogeneous leisure, labor tax recycling
Here Y i and Hi approaches deliver very similar results. As a consequence, we recommend
applying either the hybrid or the workhours approach.
Planning instruments
As regards planning instruments (LUR or road capacity expansion) one can state that all
labor supply approaches are relatively coequal. Due to the absence of tolls/taxes, there
is no direct e¤ect of the policy on VOTs such that di¤erences among the labor supply
approaches hardly evolute. This applies to the homogeneous as well as inhomogeneous
leisure assumption. Concerning land-use type regulation  we see this from the optimal
regulation formula (see Appendix C.3), where labor supply only enters the tax interaction
e¤ect TI directly, while the land market distortion e¤ect of the land-use type regulation,
i.e. the third term on the right-hand side, does not depend directly on labor supply
1

dW
dk
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
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dk
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X
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
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
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Congestion
If the only aim is to examine consequences of the policies on congestion, each of the
approaches can be applied because they provide very similar results (but note that the
causes yielding these results are di¤erent).
Land use (spatial e¤ects)
Concerning land-use and location decisions, ndings are very di¤erent. Approaches with
endogenous working hours (Hi, Hh, Y i, Y h) are characterized by much stronger spatial
resorting than the pure workdays approach (Di, Dh).
4 Conclusions
Modeling labor supply is an important issue in transportation and urban economics be-
cause it determines some basic margins of adjustments with respect to transport policies.
In our application to congestion policies we found to our surprise that the di¤erent labor
supply approaches provide very similar e¤ects on commuting and congestion even though
welfare e¤ects and e¤ects on other economic variables may di¤er considerably. Hence, if
one wants to examine e¤ects of policies on congestion only, either a pure workhours or a
workdays approach is a useful shortcut in a spatial model. We expect that this is true in
other transportation issues such as emissions, noise, infrastructure nancing, or accidents.
Most importantly, we have shown that in many cases the modeling of labor supply might
a¤ect not only the magnitude but even the direction of policy induced welfare e¤ects.
While theory is not concerned with the size of the e¤ect, which also varies a lot, a change
in the direction is a critical outcome. A nding that is even more pronounced if we
consider a monocentric city with mixed land-use in the CBD. In light of these ndings we
need a decision rule on which of the labor supply approaches is the most appropriate to
apply.
Given the missing empirical evidence on the actual labor supply behavior, the hybrid ap-
proach is suggested to be a useful choice because it takes into account endogenous working
hours as well as endogenous workdays, thereby avoiding extreme assumptions such as xed
working hours or xed workdays. According to our simulation results all three approaches
provide similar ndings when applied to planning instruments (land-use-restriction and
road capacity expansion) and, thus, the modeler is free which one to apply. The same
applies to inhomogeneous leisure and lump-sum tax recycling if we consider tax policies.
If leisure is homogeneous the usual assumption made in urban and transportation policy
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papers the workdays approaches seems to be an approximation of the hybrid approach.
In contrast, the workhours approach seems to be a better approximation to the hybrid
approach than the workdays approach when considering economic instruments with labor
tax recycling and under the assumption that leisure is inhomogeneous. We expect that
our ndings also hold in tendency when we extend to model to include other distortionary
taxes, other trip purposes during the peak or mode choice.
Our analyses underline the importance of generating knowledge on how employees adjust
their labor supply as a response to transport policy. Unfortunately there are hardly robust
empirical ndings. Hence, there is a need of data usually not fully documented in micro
data on labor markets, because households can vary their workdays by being ill, working
overtime to reduce workdays, by not fully utilizing all leave days, working part-time,
by increasing or decreasing the number of days not working when changing jobs, or by
telecommuting. This is usually not found in labor contracts or not documented in micro
data. Our study makes clear that there is need to develop such a data base because
it is crucial for policy research in some elds to know more about labor supply choices.
This might also concern time-use studies, decisions on child care, studies on worktime
exibility etc.
Of course, our analyses simplies in di¤erent ways. First, we do not consider telecom-
muting which softens the close link between workdays and commuting. We also do not
consider tax deductions of commuting costs that might lower the reduction in the VOTs
due to road charges (e.g. Hirte and Tscharaktschiew, 2013a). Further, mode and route
choice could also weaken the strong e¤ect on workdays. Nonetheless, given the weak em-
pirical research and the danger of deriving misleading ndings, it could be a promising
strategy to apply a hybrid approach that relies on more exible margins of adjustments.
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A Literature review (policy papers and labor supply
approaches)
Table 7: Literature review: studies with endogenous workhours per day and xed workdays
Paper Research questions /Policy issues
Anas (2002) Impacts of spatial segregation on urban economies
Anas and Kim (1996) Scale economies in shopping/interactions with congestion
Anas and Rhee (2006) Congestion tolls vs. urban growth boundaries
Anas and Xu (1999) Spatial e¤ects of congestion tolls
De Borger and Wuyts (2011a) Preferential tax treatment of company cars
De Palma and Lindsey (2004) Importance of traveler heterogeneity for congestion pricing
Fujishima (2011) Cordon pricing and area pricing in a dispersed city
Hotchkiss and White (1993) Spatial distribution of di¤erent household types
Olwert and Guldmann (2012) Zoning and infrastructure policies in cities
Parry and Bento (2002) Interaction of congestion with other transport related distortions
Van Ommeren and Fosgerau (2009) Estimating workersmarginal costs of commuting
Verhoef and Nijkamp (2002) Interactions between environmental/agglomeration externalities
West and Williams (2007) Optimal gasoline tax and leisure
White (1988) Residential/job location patterns in a decentralized city
White (1977) Location choice and household heterogeneity
 Spatial model (incorporating location decisions of households and/or rms)
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Table 8: Literature review: Studies with endogenous workdays and xed workhours per day
Paper Research questions /Policy issues
Arnott (2007) Congestion pricing and positive agglomeration externalities
Berg (2007) Greenhouse gas transportation policies in Sweden
Calthrop (2001) Relationship congestion toll/labor tax/commuting subsidy
De Borger and Van Dender (2003) Transport tax reform, value of time and congestion costs
De Borger and Wuyts (2009) Congestion taxes in the presence of employer-paid parking
De Borger and Wuyts (2011b)1 Congestion tolls under wage bargaining and telecommuting
Fosgerau and Pilegaard (2007) Deriving cost-benet rules for transport projects
Hirte and Tscharaktschiew (2013a) Tax deduction of commuting expenses
Hirte and Tscharaktschiew (2013b) Subsidies on electric vehicles
Lin and Prince (2009)2 Optimal gasoline tax in the California
Nitzsche and Tscharaktschiew (2013) Speed limits in cities
Parry and Bento (2001) Interactions between congestion tolls and labor taxes
Parry and Small (2005)2 Optimal gasoline tax in the US/UK
Parry (2011)2 Optimal fuel taxes in the US
Rhee (2008)1 Telecommuting and spatial commuting patterns in cities
Rhee (2009)1 E¤ects of telecommuting on city size and urban sprawl
Tscharaktschiew (2014)2 Optimal gasoline tax in Germany
Tscharaktschiew and Hirte (2010a) Household structure heterogeneity and urban economies
Tscharaktschiew and Hirte (2010b) Carbon emission pricing in urban areas
Tscharaktschiew and Hirte (2012) Subsidies to urban passenger transport
Van Dender (2003) Di¤erentiating tolls between commuting and leisure trips
Verhoef (2005) Second-best congestion pricing in a monocentric city
1 Studies dealing with telecommuting issues: modeling approach daysrefers to the on-site-work labor option
2 Studies do not explicitly model workdays, but labor supply responds to changes in travel costs
 Spatial model (incorporating location decisions of households and/or rms)
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Table 9: Literature review: Studies with xed labor supply or labor supply as residual
Paper Research questions /Policy issues
Anas and Hiramatsu (2012) E¤ects of cordon tolling
Anas and Hiramatsu (2013) E¤ects of gasoline price on an urban economy
Anas and Liu (2013) RELU-TRAN
Anas and Rhee (2007) Urban growth boundaries and congestion toll
Arnott et al. (2008) Pollution, land use
Bento et al. (2006) E¤ects of anti-sprawl policies
Brock and Wrede (2005) Subsidies for short and long distance commuting
Borck and Wrede (2008) Commuting subsidies and travel mode choice
Borck and Wrede (2009) Political economy of transport subsidies
Brueckner (2005) Transport subsidies, transport system choice and urban sprawl
Brueckner (2007) Urban growth boundaries and congestion toll
Brueckner et al. (2002) Job matching and urban location
Calthrop et al. (2000) Parking policies and road pricing
De Borger and Wouters (1998) Optimal subsidies and supply of transit
De Lara et al. (2013) Congestion pricing and spatial structure
De Salvo (1977) Household behaviour in a monocentric city
Kono et al. (2013) Regulation on building size and city boundary
Kwon (2005) Commuting costs and income
Martin (2001) Spatial mismatch and commuting subsidies
McDonald (2009) Congestion in a monocentric city
Parry (1995) Pollution taxes and tax revenue recycling
Parry and Small (2009) Urban transit subsidies
Parry and Timilsina (2010) Passenger transport pricing policies
Ross and Zenou (2009) Wages and spatial distribution of unemployment
Sullivan (1983a,b) Congestion and congestion pricing
Rhee et al. (2014) Land use/transport policies with congestion and agglomeration
Wrede (2001) Tax deduction of commuting expenses
Wrede (2009) Labor tax and commuting subsidies
 Spatial model (incorporating location decisions of households and/or rms)
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B First-order conditions (FOCs)
B.1 FOCs (Y i)
The Lagrangian in the inhomogeneous hybrid approach is
L = u

z; q;L1
`D
;L2
lL

+  f(wnh  c)D + I   (p+ cz) z   rqg+  fE   L Dg
+  feD   (h+ t)D   `D   tzzg+  feL  lL  (1  ) tzzg
The rst-order conditions then are
@L
@z
: uz =  (p+ cz) + [ +  (1  )] tz (58)
@L
@q
: uq = r (59)
@L
@L
: uL2 l =     (e  l)!  = e (60)
@L
@l
: uL2L = L! uL2 =  (61)
@L
@`
: uL1D = D ! uL1 =  (62)
@L
@D
: uL1` =   (wnh  c) +     (e  h  t  `) (63)
@L
@h
: wnD = D ! 

= wn (64)
Consolidating and (61) yields
 = e! 

= e


Substituting (62) into (63) yields
` =   (wnh  c) +     (e  h  t  `) (65)
implying the following results:
VOTDY i:


= wn =
uL1

VOTLY i:


= wn (e  t)  c
VOTlY i:


=


1
e
=
wn (e  t)  c
e
Applying this to (58) gives us
uz

= (p+ cz) +
h

 +


(1  )
i
tz
= p+ cz +

wn + (1  )

wn (e  t)  c
e

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B.2 FOCs (Y h)
By accounting for the additional restriction `  `; the Lagrangian in the homogeneous hybrid
approach becomes
L = u

z; q;L1 + L2
`D+lL

+  f(wnh  c)D + I   (p+ cz) z   rqqg+  fE   L Dg
+  feD   (h+ t)D   `D   tzzg+  feL  lL  (1  ) tzzg+   `  `D
and the corresponding rst-order conditions are
@L
@z
: uz =  (p+ cz) + [ +  (1  )] tz (66a)
@L
@L
: uLl =     (e  l)! (uL   ) l =    e!  = e (66b)
@L
@l
: uLL = L! uL =  (66c)
@L
@`
: uLD   D   D  0! uL =
(
 if ` > `
+  if ` = `
(66d)
@L
@D
: uL` =   (wnh  c) +     (e  h  t  `)  
 
`  ` (66e)
@L
@h
: wnD = D ! 

= wn (66f)
We now have to distinguish two cases: ` > ` and ` = `:
If ` > ` then  = 0. From (66b)(66d) it follows that  = e = e and uL =  = . Further,
due to (66f)


=


= wn,


= wne (67)
Due to (66e) (and use e = )
0 =   (wnh  c) +  (h+ t)
e
! 

=

wnh  c
h+ t

e! 

=
wnh  c
h+ t
This should be equivalent to (66f), thus


=
wnh  c
h+ t
= wn
This condition is only fullled if c = t = 0; i.e. if commuting is for free. Since for never consider
cases with c = t = 0; we assume that ` > ` is not a useful solution.
If ` = ` then  > 0. From (66f) it follows
(+ ) ` =   (wnh  c) +     (e  h  t  `)
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Substituting = = wn gives
0 =   (wnh  c) + 

  wn (e  h  t)  

`
which is equivalent to


= wn (e  t)  c+ 

` (68)
From (66b)(66d) we get e =    e and  = =e  . Substituting  in (66e) yields
0 =   (wnh  c) +   

e
  

(e  h  t)  `
After rearranging, dividing by ; and replacing  by (+ ) e we obtain
0 =   (wnh  c) + (+ ) e

 

(+ )


(e  h  t) + 

(e  h  t  `)
Cancelling terms and solving for gives


=  w
nt+ c
(e  `) (69)
Plugging (69) into 68 gives


= wn (e  t)  c  w
nt+ c
(e  `) `
= wn

e  t  t`
e  `

  c  c
e  ``
= wn

e  te
e  `

  ce
e  `
= wne  (wnt+ c) e
e  `
which is equivalent to V OTLY h as indicated by (20).
C Welfare
C.1 Y i: endogenous leisure hours and endogenous leisure days
Hanoch (1975) and Oi (JPE, 1976) emphasize that leisure on a workday, `, and leisure on a
non-workday, l, are inhomogeneous and, thus, should be treated as di¤erent arguments in the
utility function. To simplify the following discussion we assume that all shopping trips take
place only on shopping days. We dene deterministic utility as19
u (zij1;:::;zijJ ; qij ;L1ij ;L2ij)! u (zijk; qij ;L1ij ;L2ij) , (70)
19In the following it doesnt matter whether the residual leisure time on leisure days, `Lij , is considered.
Further, we could drop the weight for leisure hours on workdays in utility, E   Lij .
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where L1  `ij (E   Lij) and L2  Lijlij . There is a monetary budget constraint, a daily time
constraint for working days, another for leisure days and a yearly day restriction. Hence,X
k
(pk + c
z
ik) zijk + r
q
i qij =
 
wnj hij   cij

Dij + I (71a)
eDij = (hij + tij)Dij + `ijDij + 
X
k
tzikzijk (71b)
eLij = lijLij + (1  )
X
k
tzikzijk (71c)
E = Dij + Lij , (71d)
where i is the consumer price of the local consumption good in zone i, r the local housing price,
wnh = (1  w)w is the daily net wage at the working zone, where w is the marginal wage tax
rate, w is the wage.
cij  mmij + c c +
X
l
ij
t
l
czik  mmik + c c
is the tax vector of commuting where m is the miles tax,  c the cordon toll if applied, and  tij
the congestion toll per trip from i to j, and I is non-labor income arising from shared land rents
and lump sum subsidies (  ls). We assume that shopping is equally distributed across all days.
There are no other monetary travel costs.X
k
(pk + c
z
ik) zijk + r
q
i qij =
 
wnj hij   cij

Dij + I
hijDij = (e  tij)Dij   `ijDij   
X
k
tzikzijk
eLij = lijLij + (1  )
X
k
tzikzijk
E = Dij + Lij ,
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Expanding 
wnj hij   cDij

Dij =
 
wnj hij   cij

(E   Lij)
=
 
wnj
"
(e  tij)  `ij   
X
k
tzik
zijk
(E   Lij)
#
  cDij
!
(E   Lij)
=

wnj [(e  tij)  `ij ]  cij
	
(E   Lij)  wnj
X
k
tzikzijk
=

wnj (e  tij)  cDij

(E   Lij)  wnj `ij (E   Lij)  wnj
X
k
tzikzijk
=

wnj (e  tij)  cij
 
E   lij
e
Lij   (1  )
X
k
tzik
zijk
e
!
  wnj `ij (E   Lij)  wnj
X
k
tzikzijk
=

wnj (e  tij)  cij

E  

wnj (e  tij)  cij
e

lijLij   wnj `ijDij
 
X
k

wnj + (1  )

wnj (e  tij)  cij
e

tzikzijk
and rearranging gives us
X
k

pk + c
z
ik + (1  )

wnj (e  tij)  cij
e

+ wnj

tzikzijk
+

wnj (e  tij)  cij
e

lijLij + w
n
j `ijDij + r
q
i qij =

wnj (e  tij)  cij

E + I
The consolidated budget constraint is
AijE + I =
X
k
Aijkzijk + r
q
i qij + w
n
j (E   Lij) `ij +
Aij
e
lijLij , (72)
where
Aij  wnj (e  tij)  cij (73)
is the value of time (VOT) of workdays. The VOT of an hour on a workday is wnj which is
wnjDij in terms of days. 
c is an indicator which is unity if i 6= j and zero else.
The full consumer price of shopping in zone k is
Aijk  pk + czik +
"
wnj + (1  )
Aij
e
#
tzik
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For later reference we have
dAij = (e  tij) dwnj   wnj dtij   dcij (74)
dAijk = dpk + dc
z
ik + t
z
ikdw
n
j + (1  )
tzik
e
dAij (75)
= dpk + dc
z
ik + t
z
ikdw
n
j + (1  )

(e  tij) dwnj   wnj dtij   dcij
 tzik
e
= dpk + dc
z
ik   (1  )
tzik
e
dcij   (1  )
wnj t
z
ik
e
dtij +

 + (1  )

e  tij
e

tzikdw
n
j
Maximizing deterministic utility w.r.t. z, q, ` and L to obtain the FOCs in terms of days
uzijk
uzijl
=
ijk
ijl
,
u`ij
uzijk
=
wnjDij
ijk
,
uLij
uzijk
=
Aij
ijk
,
ulij
uzijk
=
Aij=e
ijk
uqij
uzij
=
rqi
ijk
(76)
Using (4)-(6d) gives indirect utility. Since all prices depend on the policy parameter ,  or  c
we write
Vij
 
 ti ; 
m;  c

=
(
maxu (zijk; qij ;L1ij ;L2ij) + 
"
AijEij + I   wnj (E   Lij) `ij  
Aij
e
lijLij  
X
k
Aijkzijk   rqi qij
#)
,
(77)
For later use we totally di¤erentiate  w.r.t. policy parameters and apply the envelope theorem
(see Rhee et al., 2014), yielding
1
ij
dVij
d tl
=

Eij   lijLij
e

dAij
d tl
  (E   Lij) `ij
dwnj
d tl
+
dARL
d tl
  d
ls
d tl
 
X
k
zijk
dAijk
d tl
  qij dr
q
i
d tl
Substituting
1
ij
dVij
d tl
=

Eij   lijLij
e

(e  tij)
dwnj
d tl
  wnj
dtij
d tl
  dcij
d tl

  (E   Lij) `ij
dwnj
d tl
+
dARL
d tl
  d
ls
d tl
  qij dr
q
i
d tl
 
X
k
zijk
dpk
d ti
 
X
k
zijk
dczik
d tl
+ (1  ) 1
e
 X
k
tzikzijk
!
dcij
d tl
+
 
(1  ) w
n
j
e
X
k
tzikzijk
!
dtij
d tl
 

 + (1  )

e  tij
e
 X
k
tzikzijk
!
dwnj
d tl
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and rearranging yields
1
ij
dVij
d tl
=
("
eE   lijLij   (1  )
 X
k
tzikzijk
!#
e  tij
e

  (E   Lij) `ij   
 X
k
tzikzijk
!)
dwnj
d tl
 
"
eE   lijLij   (1  )
 X
k
tzikzijk
!#
wnj
e
dtij
d tl
  1
e
"
eE   lijLij   (1  )
 X
k
tzikzijk
!#
dcij
d tl
 
X
k
zijk
dczik
d tl
+
dARL
d tl
  d
ls
d tl
  qij dr
q
i
d tl
 
X
k
zijk
dpk
d ti
.
Substitute eE = eDij + eLij and eLij = lijLij + (1  )
P
k t
z
ikzijk to obtain
1
ij
dVij
d tl
=
"
Dij (e  tij   `ij)  
 X
k
tzikzijk
!#
dwnj
d tl
  wnijDij
dtij
d tl
 Dij dcij
d tl
 
X
k
zijk
dczik
d tl
+
dARL
d tl
  d
ls
d tl
  qij dr
q
i
d tl
 
X
k
zijk
dpk
d ti
.
Substitute hijDij = (e  tij   `ij)Dij   
P
k t
D
ikzijk this is
1
ij
dVij
d tl
= hijDij
dwnj
d tl
  wnijDij
dtij
d tl
 Dij dcij
d tl
 
X
k
zijk
dczik
d tl
(78)
+
dARL
d tl
  d
ls
d tl
  qij dr
q
i
d tl
 
X
k
zijk
dpk
d ti
.
Since dczij=d
t
l = 0 and dcij=d
t
l = 1
1
ij
dVij
d ti
= hijDij
dwnj
d ti
  wnijDij
dtij
d ti
 Dij (79)
+
dARL
d ti
  d
ls
d ti
  qij dr
q
i
d ti
 
X
k
zijk
dpk
d ti
.
1
ji
dVji;j 6=i
d ti
= hjiDji
dwni
d ti
  wni Dji
dtji
d ti
 Dji (80)
+
dARL
d ti
  d
ls
d ti
 
X
k
zjik
dpk
d ti
  qji
drqj
d ti
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For other policies we obtain
1
ij
dVij
dm
= hijDij
dwnj
dm
  wnjDij
dtij
dm
 mijDij  
X
k
mikzijk (81)
+
dARL
dm
  d
ls
dm
 
X
k
zijk
dpk
dm
  qij dr
q
i
dm
1
ij
dVij
d c
= Dijhij
dwnj
d c
  wnjDij
dtij
d c
  cDij  
X
k 6=i
zijk (82)
+
dARL
d c
  d
ls
d c
 
X
k
zijk
dpk
d c
  qij dr
q
i
d c
1
ij
dVij
d
= Dijhij
dwnj
d
  wnjDij
dtij
d
(83)
+
dARL
d
  d
ls
d
 
X
k
zijk
dpk
d
  qij dr
q
i
d
,
where ARL is aggregate land rent and c is an indicator set to unity if i 6= j and zero otherwise.
C.1.1 Closing the model
Each household decides on its spatial choice set ij that maximizes its expected utility. Since "ij
is stochastically distributed among households for each ij, a households probability for choosing
ij is  ij = Pr
h
Vij + "ij > Vi~j + "i~j , 8 i~j 6= ij
i
. We assume that "ij is i.i.d.Gumbel distributed
with zero mean, variance 2 and dispersion parameter  = =
 

p
6

. This implies that the
choice probabilities are given by the multinominal logit model (e.g. Small and Rosen, 1981,
Anas and Rhee, 2006)
 ij =
exp (Vij)
JP
a=1
JP
b=1
exp (Vab)
, 8i; j. (84)
Production Output of local consumption goods is Xi = f (Qi; Li). It is produced by a
representative rm applying a CRS production function with land demand Qi and labor demand
Li. Applying Eulers theorem, we have
Xi = fQQi + fMMi
respectively
dXi = fQdQi + fMdMi
after multiplying by pi
pidXi = pifQdQi + pifMdMi
= rQi dQi + widMi (85)
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since we get from prot maximization
pifQ = r
Q
i , pifM = wi.
Totally di¤erentiate zero prots piXi = wiLi + r
Q
i Qi to obtain
pidXi +Xidpi = widLi +Midwi + r
Q
i dQi +Qidr
Q
i .
Plugging in (85) yields
Xidpi = Midwi +Qidr
Q
i . (86)
Government The consolidated government levies a wage tax with rate w, a miles (distance)
tax m per unit of distance, Pigouvian congestion tolls  ti and a cordon toll for entering zone 1
with rate  c. It grants lump sum transfers T ls = N ls and pays opportunity costs of infrastruc-
ture capacity risiAi, where si is the share of infrastructure on land. We assume that opportunity
costs of land are given by the highest land use price. The government budget constraint is
wTw +
X
i
 tiT
t
i + 
mTm +  cT c +N ls =
X
i
risiAi (87)
where the tax bases are (assuming there are no shopping trip costs)
Tw = N
X
i
X
j
 ijwjhijDij (88)
T ti = N
X
j
 ijDij +N
X
j 6=i
 jiDji (89)
Tm = N
X
i
X
j
 ijmijDij +N
X
i
X
j
 ij
X
k
mikzijk (90)
T c = N
X
i
X
j 6=i
 ijDij +N
X
i
X
j
 ij
X
k 6=i
zijk: (91)
Di¤erentiating the government budget constraint (87) w.r.t. to  tk yields
d ls
d tk
=
X
siAi
dri
d tk
  1
N
T tk  
1
N
X
j
 tj
dT tj
d tk
  
w
N
dTw
d tk
(92)
d ls
dm
=
X
siAi
dri
dm
  1
N
Tm   1
N
dTm
dm
  
w
N
dTw
dm
d ls
d c
=
X
siAi
dri
d c
  1
N
T c   1
N
 c
dT c
d c
  
w
N
dTw
d c
d ls
d
=
X
siAi
dri
d
  
w
N
dTw
d
d ls
dsk
= rkAk +
X
siAi
dri
dsk
  
w
N
dTw
dsk
where we dene capacity
Ki  isiAi (93)
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and assume that only one congestion related policy is applied.
Market Clearing Private consumption plus public consumption add up to demand for urban
goods. Because local goods are produced with a CRS production function where local labor is
the only input, the local good markets are cleared too. The market clearing conditions of local
labor markets are
Mi = N
X
j
 jihjiDji, 8i. (94)
and those of the local land markets are
(1  si)Ai = Qi +N
X
j
 ijqij , 8i. (95)
In the case of zoning there are two local land markets in each zone: one for residential use
i (1  si)Ai = N
P
j  ijqij and the other for business use: (1  i) (1  si)Ai = Qi.
Eventually, the population has to be fully distributed across the city. This is achieved becauseP
i
P
j  ij = 1. There are six market clearing conditions plus the government budget constraint
and seven unknowns:

r1; r2; p1; p2; w1; w2; 
ls
	
.
For later use we totally di¤erentiate the market clearing conditions to have
dXi = N
X
j
X
k
( ijdzijk + zijkd ij) (96)
dMi = N
X
j
( jihjidDji +  jiDjidhji + hjiDjid ji) (97)
dAi = dQi +N
X
j
( ijdqij + qijd ij) +Aidsi = 0 (98)
With LUR we have ( (1  si)Ai =
P
 ijqij , (1  ) (1  si)Ai = Qi). Then
N
X
j

 ij
dqij
d
+ qij
d ij
d

= (1  si)Ai
dQi
d
=   (1  si)Ai
dQi
d
= N
X
j

 ij
dqij
d
+ qij
d ij
d

. (99)
We dene aggregate land rents (ARL)
ALR  N
X
i
X
j
 ijr
q
i qi +
X
rQi Qi +
X
i
risiAi (100)
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to obtain
dALR
d(k)
= N
X
i
X
j

 ijr
q
i
dqi
d(k)
+  ijqi
drqi
d(k)
+ rqi qi
d ij
d(k)

+
X
i
 
rQi
dQi
d(k)
+Qi
drQi
d(k)
!
(101)
+ rkAk
dsk
d(k)
+
X
i
siAi
dri
d(k)
.
C.2 Marginal welfare changes with lump sum recycling
We use the hybrid approach Y h as our benchmark because it is the most general model without
any restrictions on the choice of leisure. Welfare
W = E

max(ij) (Vij + "ij)

=
1

ln
X
i
X
j
exp (Vij) . (102)
We maximize welfare subject to the public budget constraint and the market clearing conditions
by choosing congestion tolls  tk; for each zone k.
Instead of using the Lagrangian approach we simplify derivations by proceeding in the following
way. We derive welfare changes of a small change in investment. Next, we set this to zero
to nd the optimum and subsequently put in all restrictions (Rhee et al. 2014, or Hirte and
Tscharaktschiew, 2013).
The derivation of the expected welfare function w.r.t. to any policy instrument is
dW
d tk
= N
X
i
X
j
 ij
dVij
d tk
(103)
Plugging (79) into (103) yields for the congestion toll
dW
d tk
=  N
X
i
X
j
 ijijw
n
jDij
dtij
d tk
(104)
 N
X
i
X
j
 ijij
kDij +N (1  w)
X
i
X
j
 ijijhijDij
dwj
d tk
 N
X
i
X
j
X
l
 ijijzijl
dpl
d tk
 N
X
i
X
j
 ijijqij
drqi
d tk
+N
dALR
d tk
 Nd
ls
d tk
where the indicator k is unity if i or j equals k and zero otherwise and with the average marginal
utility of income dened as
 
X
i
X
j
	ijij . (105)
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For the emission tax we get from di¤erentiating (81) w.r.t. the miles tax rate
dW
dm
=  N
X
i
X
j
 ijijw
n
jDij
dtij
dm
(106)
 N
X
i
X
j
 ijij
 
mijDij +
X
k
mikzijk
!
+N (1  w)
X
i
X
j
 ijijhijDij
dwj
dm
 N
X
i
X
j
X
l
 ijijzijl
dpl
dm
 N
X
i
X
j
 ijijqij
drqi
dm
+N
dALR
dm
 Nd
ls
dm
.
The di¤erential of (82) w.r.t. the cordon toll is
dW
d c
=  N
X
i
X
j
 ijijw
n
jDij
dtij
d c
(107)
 N
X
i
X
j
 ijij
0@cDij +X
k 6=i
zijk
1A+N (1  w)X
i
X
j
 ijijhijDij
dwj
d c
 N
X
i
X
j
X
l
 ijijzijl
dpl
d c
 N
X
i
X
j
 ijijqij
drqi
d c
+N
dALR
d c
 Nd
ls
d c
.
For land-use regulation i, we have (from (83))
dW
dk
=  N
X
i
X
j
 ijijw
n
jDij
dtij
dk
(108)
+N (1  w)
X
i
X
j
 ijijhijDij
dwj
dk
 N
X
i
X
j
X
l
 ijijzijl
dpl
dk
 N
X
i
X
j
 ijijqij
drqi
dk
+N
dALR
dk
 Nd
ls
dk
.
Exchanging i with si gives the welfare change with road capacity expansion.
Using (101) and (92) expands (104)
dW
d tk
=  N
X
i
X
j
 ijijw
n
jDij
dtij
d tk
 N
X
i
X
j
 ijij
kDij
+N (1  w)
X
i
X
j
 ijijhijDij
dwj
d tk
 N
X
i
X
j
X
l
 ijijzijl
dpl
d tk
 N
X
i
X
j
 ijijqij
drqi
d tk
+ N
X
i

 ijr
q
i
dqi
d tk
+  ijqi
drqi
d tk
+ rqi qi
d ij
d tk

+ 
X
i
 
rQi
dQi
d tk
+Qi
drQi
d tk
!
+ 
X
i
siAi
dri
d tk
  
X
siAi
dri
d tk
+ T tk + 
X
j
 tj
dT tj
d tk
+ w
dTw
d tk
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Substituting (92) yields
1

dW
d tk
=  N

X
i
X
j
 ijijDijw
n
j
dtij
d tk
  N

X
i
X
j
 ijij
kDij (109)
+
N

(1  w)
X
i
X
j
 ijijhijDij
dwj
d tk
  N

X
i
X
j
X
l
 ijijzijl
dpl
d tk
  N

X
i
X
j
 ijijqi
drqi
d tk
+N
X
i

 ijr
q
i
dqi
d tk
+  ijqi
drqi
d tk
+ rqi qi
d ij
d tk

+
X
i
 
rQi
dQi
d tk
+Qi
drQi
d tk
!
+
X
i
siAi
dri
d tk
 
X
siAi
dri
d tk
+
0@NX
j
 kjDkj +N
X
j 6=k
 jkDjk
1A
| {z }P
i
P
j  ij
kDij
+N
X
i
 ti
24X
j

 ij
dDij
d tk
+Dij
d ij
d tk

+N
X
j 6=i

 ji
dDji
dk
+Dji
d ji
dk
35
+ wN
X
i
X
j

 ijwjhij
dDij
d tk
+  ijwjDij
dhij
d tk
+ wjhijDij
d ij
d tk
+  ijhijDij
dwj
d tk

.
It is convenient to dene the marginal external costs of congestion (dtijd = t
0
i + ijt
0
j) as
MEC(k)  N
X
i
X
j
	ijDijw
n
j
dtij=d(k)
dF=d(k)
, (110)
where F is overall tra¢ c ow.
After expanding (109) by  times di¤erent terms, we have
1

dW
d tk
= MECtk

  dF
d tk

+MECtk

dF
d tk

mectk
MECtk
  1

(111)
 N
X
i
X
j
 ij
kDij
"
N
P
i
P
j  ijij
kDij
N
P
i
P
j  ij
kDij
  1
#
+ Ytk

ytk
Ytk
  1

+N
X
i

 ijr
q
i
dqi
d tk
+  ijqi
drqi
d tk
+ rqi qi
d ij
d tk

+
X
i
 
rQi
dQi
d tk
+Qi
drQi
d tk
!
+N
X
i
 ti
24X
j

 ij
dDij
d tk
+Dij
d ij
d tk

+N
X
j 6=i

 ji
dDji
dk
+Dji
d ji
dk
35
+ wN
X
i
X
j

 ijwjhij
dDij
d tk
+  ijwjDij
dhij
d tk
+ wjhijDij
d ij
d tk

,
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where we applied the denitions for price induced changes in average market income minus
expenditure, Y , the sum of individual utility values of price induced changes in market income
minus expenditures, and the sum of individual utility values of marginal external congestion
costs
Ytk  N
X
i
X
j
 ijhijDij
dwj
d tk
 N
X
i
X
j
X
l
 ijzijl
dpl
d tk
 N
X
i
X
j
 ijqi
drqi
d tk
(112)
ytk  N
X
i
X
j
 ijijhijDij
dwj
d tk
 N
X
i
X
j
X
l
 ijijzijl
dpl
d tk
 N
X
i
X
j
	ijijqi
drqi
d tk
(113)
mectk  N
X
i
X
j
	ijijDijw
n
j
dtij=d
k
dF=d tk
. (114)
Next we dene the distributional characteristics
Ytk 
ytk
Ytk
, Etk 
mectk
MECtk
, Ttk 
 
N
P
i
P
j  ijij
kDij
N
P
i
P
j  ij
kDij
!
(115)
to simplify (111)
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The second row gives the average change in income minus expenditure due to changes in market
prices. The third row represents behavioral changes in the land market and the fourth and
fth row display changes in tax revenue due to behavior responses. The last row represents
redistribution e¤ects due to di¤erences in the MUI between household types. By inserting (98)
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and (86) (116) simplies to
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where the adjustment term giving the response of the tax base to its toll is
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Dening the second and third row as the tax interaction term and the fourth row as the redis-
tribution term yields (42)
1

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C.3 General case u (z; q; `; L) ;(model Y h) no restriction - with
land-use type regulation
For land-use regulation i, we start with (108)
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Using (101) and (92) expands (104)
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Marginal external costs of are
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After expanding (120) by  times di¤erent terms, we have
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where we use the following denitions:
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Next we dene the distributional characteristics
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By inserting (98) and (86) (123) simpli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and dQid =   (1  si)Ai)
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Dening the second and third row as the tax interaction term and the fourth row as the redis-
tribution term yields (42)
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The optimal regulation requires
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Land-use type restrictions are considered to be a second-best remedy to congestion tolls (e.g.
Rhee et al. 2014). They are spatially di¤erentiated across locations and, thus, can drive people
living in suburbs and working in the city to move to the city. By doing so, congestion on the
suburb-city relation might decline, but it will increase in the city-city and city-suburb relation.
It is not possible to derive general lessons from the equations. We only see, that marginal
congestion costs are a component of the optimal LUR. The higher MEC the higher LUR. In
that way, LUR is a device to lower congestion. On the other side LURs generate distortions
in the land market by driving a wedge between residential and business land prices, cause tax
62
interaction and redistribution e¤ects. Hence, the optimal  cannot be determined from theory.
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D Detailed tables
Table 10: Policy e¤ects of road capacity expansion with inhomogeneous leisure
Road capacity expansion - Case 2a Benchmark Hours Hi Hybrid Y i Days Di
Time allocation
Workdays per year 263 0 0  1
Leisure days per year 52 0 +1 +1
Hours on a workday spent working/leisure 8.3/5.8 +0.2/ 0.1 +0.2/ 0.1 0/+0.1
Hours on a workday spent/commuting/shopping 1.1/0.8  0.1/0  0.1/0  0.1/0
Hours on a leisure day spent leisure/shopping 12.0/4.0 +0.1/ 0.1 0/0 +0.1/ 0.1
Total labor supply [hours/year] 2187 +41 +47 +7
Total leisure demand [hours/year] 2164  23  31 +13
Total commuting time on workdays [hours/year] 272  10  8  8
Total shopping time [hours/year] 417  8  8  12
Travel/Transport/Tra¢ c
Travel time delay [hours/year] 31  10  10  10
MEC [$-cents/mile] 22  7  7  8
Total travel time [hours/year] 689  18  16  20
One-way commuting time [minutes] 31  1  1  1
VOT of one hour on a workday [$/hour] 13.87  0.05  0.06  0.71
Commuting trips [million/year] citycity 25.4  0.5  0.4  0.4
Commuting trips [million/year] citysuburb 19.3  0.4  0.4  0.4
Commuting trips [million/year] suburbcity 45.0 +0.7 +0.8 +0.9
Commuting trips [million/year] suburbsuburb 41.6 +0.2 +0.4 +0.4
Households
Gross income [$/year] 61,071 +1,247 +1,410 +375
Consumption (shopping) [trips/year] 472  10  10  15
Average housing demand [sqr feet] 7778  345  342  354
Urban Economy
Total urban production [million units] 556.7 +6.3 +7.6  0.4
Urban GDP [billion $/year] 29.1 +0.4 +0.5 0
EV [million $/year]   499  476  633
Rent city/suburb [$/sqr feet*year] 5.95/2.22 +0.36/+0.06 +0.38/+0.07 +0.28/+0.02
Wage rate city/suburb [$/hour] 22.81/19.65  0.15/ 0.01  0.16/ 0.03  0.12/+0.01
Government
Labor tax revenue [million $/year] 8171 +119 +139 +6
Lump-sum tax revenue [million $/year] 974 +964 +970 +959
Infrastructure costs [million $/year] 7197 +1083 +1309 +965
Location
Households city 168,687  3,556  3,532  3,706
Households suburb 331,313 +3,556 +3,532 +3,706
Jobs city 268,099 +603 +613 +686
Jobs suburb 231,901  603  613  686
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Table 11: Policy e¤ects of a miles tax with inhomogeneous leisure
Miles Tax - Case 3a Benchmark Hours Hi Hybrid Y i Days Di
Time allocation
Workdays per year 263 0  1  1
Leisure days per year 52 0 +1 +1
Hours on a workday spent working/leisure 8.3/5.8 0/0 0/0 0/0
Hours on a workday spent/commuting/shopping 1.1/0.8 0/0 0/0 0/0
Hours on a leisure day spent leisure/shopping 12.0/4.0 0/0 +0.1/ 0.1 +0.1/ 0.1
Total labor supply [hours/year] 2187 +1  1  2
Total leisure demand [hours/year] 2164 0 +3 +3
Total commuting time on workdays [hours/year] 272 0  1  1
Total shopping time [hours/year] 417  1  1  1
Travel/Transport/Tra¢ c
Travel time delay [hours/year] 31 0  1 0
MEC [$-cents/mile] 22 0 0 0
Total travel time [hours/year] 689  1  1  2
One-way commuting time [minutes] 31 0 0 0
VOT of one hour on a workday [$/hour] 13.87 0 0  0.01
Commuting trips [million/year] citycity 25.4 +0.2 +0.2 +0.2
Commuting trips [million/year] citysuburb 19.3  0.1  0.2  0.2
Commuting trips [million/year] suburbcity 45.0  0.2  0.2  0.2
Commuting trips [million/year] suburbsuburb 41.6 +0.1 0 0
Households
Gross income [$/year] 61,071 +19  32  55
Consumption (shopping) [trips/year] 472 0 0 0
Average housing demand [sqr feet] 7778  3  4  5
Urban Economy
Total urban production [million units] 556.7 +0.2  0.2  0.3
Urban GDP [billion $/year] 29.1 0 0 0
EV [million $/year]  +4  4  6
Rent city/suburb [$/sqr feet*year] 5.95/2.22 +0.01/0 +0.01/0 +0.01/0
Wage rate city/suburb [$/hour] 22.81/19.65  0.01/0  0.01/+0.01  0.01/0
Government
Labor tax revenue [million $/year] 8171 +2  4  7
Lump-sum tax revenue [million $/year] 974  237  238  237
Miles tax revenue [million $/year] +241 +240.5 +241
Infrastructure costs [million $/year] 7197 +6  2  4
Location
Households city 168,687 +155 +148 +84
Households suburb 331,313  155  148  84
Jobs city 268,099 +9 +1 +21
Jobs suburb 231,901  9  1  21
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Table 12: Policy e¤ects of a cordon toll with inhomogeneous leisure
Cordon Toll - Case 4a Benchmark Hours Hi Hybrid Y i Days Di
Time allocation
Workdays per year 263 0  1  1
Leisure days per year 52 0 +1 +1
Hours on a workday spent working/leisure 8.3/5.8 0/0 +0.1/0 0/+0.1
Hours on a workday spent/commuting/shopping 1.1/0.8 0/0  0.1/0  0.1/0
Hours on a leisure day spent leisure/shopping 12.0/4.0 0/0 +0.1/ 0.1 +0.1/ 0.1
Total labor supply [hours/year] 2187 +3  2  4
Total leisure demand [hours/year] 2164 +3 +10 +8
Total commuting time on workdays [hours/year] 272  6  7  7
Total shopping time [hours/year] 417 0 0  1
Travel/Transport/Tra¢ c
Travel time delay [hours/year] 31  3  4  3
MEC [$-cents/mile] 22  2  2  2
Total travel time [hours/year] 689  6  8  8
One-way commuting time [minutes] 31  1  1  1
VOT of one hour on a workday [$/hour] 13.87  0.04  0.03  0.08
Commuting trips [million/year] citycity 25.4 +1.1 +1.0 +1.0
Commuting trips [million/year] citysuburb 19.3  1.2  1.2  1.3
Commuting trips [million/year] suburbcity 45.0  1.7  1.9  1.7
Commuting trips [million/year] suburbsuburb 41.6 +1.8 +1.7 +1.6
Households
Gross income [$/year] 61,071  53  185  392
Consumption (shopping) [trips/year] 472 0 0  1
Average housing demand [sqr feet] 7778  5  8  14
Urban Economy
Total urban production [million units] 556.7 +0.5  0.6  1.0
Urban GDP [billion $/year] 29.1 0  0.1  0.2
EV [million $/year]  0.009  0.011  0.027
Rent city/suburb [$/sqr feet*year] 5.95/2.22 +0.1/0  0.01/ 0.01  0.02/ 0.01
Wage rate city/suburb [$/hour] 22.81/19.65  0.01/ 0.09  0.01/ 0.08  0.01/ 0.20
Government
Labor tax revenue [million $/year] 8171  8  24  52
Lump-sum tax revenue [million $/year] 974  608  610  603
Cordon toll revenue [million $/year] +614 +612 +613
Infrastructure costs [million $/year] 7197  2  19  42
Location
Households city 168,687  413  419  610
Households suburb 331,313 +413 +419 +610
Jobs city 268,099  2,792  2,725  2,044
Jobs suburb 231,901 +2,792 +2,725 +2,044
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Table 13: Policy e¤ects of land-use type regulation (LUR) with inhomogeneous leisure
LUR - Case 5a Benchmark Hours Hi Hybrid Y i Days Di
Time allocation
Workdays per year 263 0  1  1
Leisure days per year 52 0 +1 +1
Hours on a workday spent working/leisure 8.3/5.8 0.1/0 +0.1/0 0/+0.1
Hours on a workday spent/commuting/shopping 1.1/0.8  0.1/0  0.1/0  0.1/0
Hours on a leisure day spent leisure/shopping 12.0/4.0 +0.1/ 0.1 0/0 +0.1/ 0.1
Total labor supply [hours/year] 2187 +22 +24  19
Total leisure demand [hours/year] 2164  12  15 +30
Total commuting time on workdays [hours/year] 272  4  4  4
Total shopping time [hours/year] 417  5  5  7
Travel/Transport/Tra¢ c
Travel time delay [hours/year] 31  4  3  3
MEC [$-cents/mile] 22  3  3  3
Total travel time [hours/year] 689  10  9  11
One-way commuting time [minutes] 31 0 0 0
VOT of one hour on a workday [$/hour] 13.87  0.34  0.35  0.63
Commuting trips [million/year] citycity 25.4 +1.2 +1.2 +1.1
Commuting trips [million/year] citysuburb 19.3 +1.1 +1.1 +1.1
Commuting trips [million/year] suburbcity 45.0  1.3  1.2  1.2
Commuting trips [million/year] suburbsuburb 41.6  0.9  0.9  0.8
Households
Gross income [$/year] 61,071  749  680  1,106
Consumption (shopping) [trips/year] 472  4  4  6
Average housing demand [sqr feet] 7778  388  388  388
Urban Economy
Total urban production [million units] 556.7 +5.5 +6.1 +2.5
Urban GDP [billion $/year] 29.1  0.4  0.4  0.6
EV [million $/year]   16  6  74
Rent city: housing/business [$/sqr feet] 5.95  0.47/+1.89  0.46/+1.89  0.50/+1.84
Rent suburb: housing/business [$/sqr feet] 2.22 +0.06/ 0.27 +0.00/ 0.27 +0.04/ 0.26
Wage rate city/suburb [$/hour] 22.81/19.65  0.69/ 0.35  0.69/ 0.35  0.68/ 0.33
Government
Labor tax revenue [million $/year] 8171  65  87  155
Lump-sum tax revenue [million $/year] 974  817  804  791
Infrastructure costs [million $/year] 7197 +15  13  56
Location
Households city 168,687 +8,398 +8,475 +8,209
Households suburb 331,313  8,398  8,475  8,209
Jobs city 268,099  770  768  817
Jobs suburb 231,901 +770 +768 +817
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E List of Variables
Travel and transport Closing the model
mi two-way distance in zone i 	ij choice probability of type ij
mij two-way distance of household ij Vij deterministic indirect utility
ij indicator of whether to travel in the other zone Xi local production of consumption goods
Fi tra¢ c ow in zone i Qi o¢ ce space demand in i
fi tra¢ cdensity in zone i Mi local labor demand in i
Ki road capacity in zone i Ai local land supply
tij travel time for two-way trip ij si share of land used for roads
ti travel time in zone i  road capacity per unit of land
tzik two-way travel time for shopping trip from i to k
Individual choice
uij direct utility of household ij Government variables
L1ij leisure on workday w wage tax rate
L2ij leisure on leisure days m distance tax rate
zijk shopping of household ij in zone k  tk congestion toll in i
pijk mill price for shopping  c cordon toll
wnj net wage earned in zone j 
ls lump-sum tax
hij hours spent working per day T ls lump sum tax base
cij monetary travel costs for two-way trip ij incl. taxes Tw labor tax base
I non wage income Tm miles tax base
e hours endowment per day T c cordon toll base
Dij workdays per year T ti congestion toll base in i
`ij leisure hours on a workday N number of households in the city
 share of shopping trips on a workday i land-use: share of residential land in i
Lij leisure days ALR aggregate land rent
lij leisure hours on a leisure day
E days per year  average MUI
ij MUI of household ij MEC marginal external costs
 Lagrangian multiplier of a day RE redistribution
 Lagrangian multiplier of time on a workday  distributional characteristics
 Lagrangian multiplier of time on a leisure day k indicator: if relevant
Pijk full consumer price for shopping in k Adj adjustment: distortion of the tax
qij housing demand of household ij Ti tax interation e¤ect
ri housing price in i
Table 14: List of variables
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